Volume 14,
Number 6
June 2004
Mobilization
of the Masses: How Much of a Threat is the USDA?
Food
Scarcity in the Rice Bowl of Asia
China's
Role in Burma: Can the SPDC Survive Without Chinese Support?
By L. Hancock
"People were all bloody. We were all broken. I was lucky to have escaped…I
bumped into their people who were lying in wait for us. They were chasing us
like animals. They also beat up people who were on the motorbikes in front...We
had to drive our car into the paddy-fields…At about ten, we heard spurts
of gun-shots. We saw burning cars…I don’t know who was alive and
who was dead. All of them were lying flat on the ground with flowing blood.”1
That’s what twenty-six year old witness Ko Wunna Maung of Mandalay testified,
describing the chilling violence that occurred on “Black Friday”,
May 30, 2003. He was driving alongside the car that held Daw Aung San Suu Kyi,
when hundreds of NLD (National League for Democracy) supporters in a convoy
of twenty cars and twenty-five motorbikes fell under attack by gunfire, catapults,
bamboo stakes, and steel and iron pipes. More than a year has passed since the
Depayin Incident occurred, and an influx of reports and eye-witness accounts
have been published, yet the exact details of what happened that night remain
vague. Amidst all this uncertainty one thing is abundantly clear: the statement
made by the governing SPDC (State Peace and Development Council) that 4 people
were killed and 50 injured at the hands of the NLD2 is undoubtedly a farce.
The 500 to 1,000 recruited attackers responsible for the imprisonment, rape,
murder and injury of the uncountable NLD members and supporters were under the
direct orders and orchestration of the SPDC and the United Solidarity and Development
Association, or USDA.
On September 15, 1993, SLORC (State Law and Order Restoration Council) chairman
Than Shwe formed the USDA under the Association Law (SLORC Law 6/88), legislating
that the USDA was to be “purely a social welfare organization,”3
and not a political party. Although the USDA is devoid of political status,
it is puppeteered by the SPDC. As early as February, 1994, evidence was obtained
of the USDA’s “thuggish” approach to organizing mass-rallies
in support of the SPDC. A letter to the BBC, broadcast on February 21, 1994,
describes the forced attendance of several thousand people, gathered in a compound
in Prome the night before a rally. It explains how, when people were refused
permission to leave even to use the toilet, a conflict arose and people tried
to escape, climbing up the fences. The guards “began to beat them with
pieces of bamboo and sticks,” a riot ensued, and “two men were trampled
to death. Twenty people were wounded…two women had their backs broken”4.
Despite this, the rally was carried out the following day (February 7) as planned.
This was by no means an isolated occurrence. Methods including threats, fines,
bribery, and force are freely used to achieve the requisite numbers of “supporters,”
to reinforce the impression that the USDA is a well established mass organization.
USDA members receive many economic advantages and job opportunities, which would
otherwise be unavailable. With control of a number of bus routes, important
documents such as visas, and many businesses, such as The Myan Gone Myint company,
the gems market and Myanmar Economic Holdings Co. Ltd., the USDA is infiltrating
the economic fibre of society. It is being presented as a key to opportunity,
a broadening of a very narrow horizon, a tempting form of bribery many ordinary,
struggling people would find difficult to resist.
Now that the National Convention has reconvened, with the official intention
of drawing up a new constitution, fears of the USDA and the power that it may
wield have heightened, with recent speculation about them being established
as an official political party, to contend in elections. Considering that the
leaders of the USDA include Head of State Than Shwe and other prominent members
of the SPDC, this can be seen as a tool for them to create a façade of
democracy, without any fear of actually losing their chokehold on power. Its
structure and development parallels that of the Indonesian military social organization,
Golkar. In 1971 an election was held in Indonesia, led by the New Order party’s
President Suharto, in which Golkar won the majority of the seats. What was initially
meant to be a social welfare group became the winning party, alongside New Order,
in the following five undemocratic elections. Both parties dominated Indonesia’s
political situation for the following 32 years. The USDA has come a long way
from being a “purely social welfare organization”. In June 1997
it was referred to as an “auxiliary national defense force”, by
the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Maung Aye5. Reports have revealed
that by the year 2000 the USDA was undergoing military training and members
have become reserve army forces, and its role in military intelligence is becoming
increasingly prominent. It even received international recognition as a political
party when on, October 25, 2000, Lt. Gen. Win Myint was officially welcomed
to Beijing, as vice-president of the USDA, rather than as a senior member of
the SPDC.
Given the apparent threat, it is important to consider the practicality of the
USDA becoming a political party. One must remember that the USDA is merely a
by-product of the SPDC, and except for China, it has no international links.
Even their own membership, though numerous, is by no means authentic. The percentage
of willing members is unknown, but considered to be a minority. The USDA also
relies heavily on the material benefits and economic opportunities provided
by the SPDC. In light of recent sanctions from the US and EU, following the
notorious Depayin Incident, it is very possible that the SPDC will not be able
to maintain its levels of control. It would be even more unlikely, in that situation,
that the USDA will be able to stand independently as a political party. If the
SPDC begins to relinquish power, the USDA will fold.
More worrying, perhaps, are the USDA’s attentions to youth and its apparent
plans to destroy the NLD. Children are manipulated into becoming members at
school in order to pass exams, compromising the quality of their education,
as reaching any suitable understanding of the curriculum is undermined. Article
29 of the Conventions on the Rights of the Child, to which Burma has been a
signatory since 1991, states that, “The education of the child shall be
directed to the development of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,
for the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, for the natural
environment, and the preparation of the child for responsible life in a free
society.”6 However, in Burma many students are forced to attend USDA mass
rallies under threat of beatings and fines. Student Unions have been banned,
resulting in the arrest and interrogation of many students aged 13-18, who tried
to get involved in the democracy movement. The USDA’s intentions for the
youth are a violation of the Rights of the Child convention: “the patriotic
youth, who are members of the USDA, are self-reliant; they have their own initiative…Their
strength which is growing year by year, is used for the state… By using
their strength, they will oppose anyone who will infringe and disturb the stability
of the state… The youth mass will join hands… to totally remove
these destructive elements if they try to disturb, damage, or destroy the state.”7
It is evident that the children of Burma are far from living in a “free
society”. Instead of being taught freedom and democracy, they are being
trained to destroy these values. How will they develop a respect for human rights,
when the very concept is alien to them? They are growing up in a society where
the NLD and its supporters, the very core and symbol of democracy and freedom
in Burma, are being actively crippled. A former USDA member involved in “Black
Friday” testified to Radio Free Asia that they were simply ordered to
beat NLD members and supporters, that many of the women detained after the attack
were raped, that men were hired to dig holes at an abandoned compound where
“they brought the bodies, maybe 100 there, including people who were alive
with serious injuries...We, the whole town, knew that it was a premeditated
attack. But the authorities are trying to cover it up by arresting and killing
those who witnessed it.”8 Those who support and participate in the struggle
for democracy in Burma are clearly placing their very lives at risk, but under
all this oppression and fear of the SPDC/USDA it is evident that their beliefs
in democracy and hopes for freedom have not been deterred.
Endnotes
1 “On the Border”: Democratic Voice of Burma, 4th July, 2003
2 “Myanmar Cracks Down on Opposition”: LA Times, 2nd June, 2003
3 NLD statement 105 (7/00), 12th July, 2000.
4 “Union Solidarity Development Association”: Letters to the BBC:
Letter #1 (broadcast on February 21, 1994), An independent report by the Karen
Human Rights Group, March 7th, 1994.
5 “The USDA Factor” by Min Zin, the Irrawaddy, 6th July, 2003.
6 ABFSU: Rights on the Child in Burma; Pre-sessional working group meeting of
the 36 sessions of the UNCRC, Thar Nyunt Oo, 5th February, 2004.
7 FBIS (Foreign Broadcasting Information Service), 16thMay, 1996.
8 “Killings, Rapes in Well-planned Attack by Burmese Junta”: Radio
Free Asia, 5th September, 2003.
By A. Campbell
"A State that respects the right to food of the people living in its territory
should ensure that every individual has permanent access at all times to sufficient
and adequate food, and should refrain from taking measures liable to deprive
anyone of such access.” According to this mandate proposed in Article
2 by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in April 2003,
Burma is not only a nation that deprives its people of food, but continues to
propagate widespread hunger within its borders.
George Orwell, a public servant to Burma from 1922-1927, predicted that Burma
would be the country most likely to prosper after British rule. Instead, in
less than 40 years, Burma has plunged from its status as the world’s largest
rice exporter to one of the world’s least developed countries according
to the United Nations. It is a nation with vast natural resources and economic
potential, but the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) continues
to deny many citizens their basic human rights, including the right to food.
In 1997, the Food and Agriculture Organization defined food security as “the
access for all people at all times to enough food for an active, healthy life.”
Burma is rich in resources, however, most remain undeveloped. Those that are
used and expanded such as paddy and other agricultural products, are targeted
by the government to supply the military. The result is the coercion of Burma’s
civilian population, primarily ethnic minorities whose livelihoods are based
on agriculture, into supplying the army before their own needs.
According to written submissions to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees
by the Asian Legal Resource Centre in light of findings made by the People’s
Tribunal on Food Scarcity and Militarisation in Burma in February 2001, the
SPDC continually puts “military interests above food security.”
Research for the People’s Tribunal was undertaken by Burma Issues and
and the Asian Human Rights Commission between 1997 and 1999 and provides explicit
evidence that food scarcity in Burma is a direct result of the militarization
the SPDC continues to uphold in the country.
In its first submission to the People’s Tribunal in February 1999, Burma
Issues and the Asian Human Rights Commission found that in zones of conflict,
the SPDC systematically destroys and confiscates food supplies, burning whole
villages and slashing, burning or uprooting stores of paddy. Landmines laid
both by the SPDC and ethnic insurgent groups restrict access to farmland. In
areas partially controlled by the government, development projects have caused
an increase in forced labour and portering, eliminating valuable time farmers
could spend tending their fields. Land confiscation and unofficial taxation
continue to be widespread in areas where the SPDC has gained significant control.
Even in so-called ‘white zones’, or areas where the SPDC has full
control, development and the benefits of food production have largely gone to
members of the military and civil service.
Mark Tamthai of the People’s Tribunal wrote a submission to the UN Commission
on Human Rights in March 2000 stating one of the most at-risk groups in Burma
in regards to food scarcity are the thousands of Internally Displaced People
who have been forced out of their homes by counter-insurgency programs and who
have fled into the jungles of eastern Burma where food is unreliable.
The problem of food scarcity in Burma has been ongoing for decades. Two government
programs in particular initiated widespread hunger in the country. The first
of these, the Four Cuts Program, developed by General Ne Win in the mid-1960’s,
aimed to cut the four main links, food, funds, intelligence and recruits, from
insurgent groups. The People’s Tribunal states that the Four Cuts incentive
was a counter-insurgency program that inevitably affected the civilian population.
In areas of civil war, the SPDC forcibly relocated villages to government-controlled
areas, burning homes and crops behind them to impede villagers from returning
to cultivate food. It proved an effective way of stopping the flow of resources
to insurgent groups and increased military control in ethnic areas.
The second government-run operation that contributed to food scarcity in Burma
was the Paddy Procurement Program. The system was introduced nationally in 1974-1975,
and allowed for the compulsory purchase of paddy produced across the nation
by the SPCD at prices substantially below market value. Rice levies and quotas
imposed on villages forced farmers to sell the required rice quota to the military.
The compulsory paddy-purchase program was in the words of the Asian Legal Resource
Centre in a written submission to the United Nations, “based upon the
land holdings of each farmer and without regard to actual production.”
The quota was enforced whether or not farmers’ crops yielded the required
amount. This sent farmers to the market to buy the rice their own fields couldn’t
produce, at market value, just to sell it to the military at the state-set price
just to meet the required quota. This left many of Burma’s farmers with
little to feed their families.
While both government operations have officially ended, the Four Cuts Program
at the onset of the 21st century and the Paddy Procurement System in April 2003,
remnants of both systems are still visible. In October 2003, the Burmese Border
Consortium (BBC) in its report “Reclaiming the right to rice: Food security
and internal displacement in eastern Burma,” said, “the imposition
of production quotas and implicit sales taxes on paddy persists in impoverishing
farmers, despite the government’s announcement that the paddy procurement
program will be cancelled in the coming year.”
Internal documents received by Burma Issues confirm the BBC’s statement.
Forced relocation, displacement, extortion, unofficial taxes, land confiscation,
forced portering and forced labour continue to happen and are visible signs
the old policies are still in effect unofficially, effectively robbing Burma’s
citizens of their right to food. Villagers in relocation sites are forced to
pay exorbitant sums of money in agricultural taxes, for development projects
and security programs including fees for forced labour and village security.
Karen villagers still claim that it is hard to survive and that there is not
enough food. With lack of development and a living standard lower than the average,
many are forced into poverty.
Food scarcity remains a problem in so-called free-fire zones as well. Development
projects spearheaded by the government require forced labour and villagers in
relocation sites are prime targets. Every moment spent working on a government
development project is one less moment villagers can spend cultivating food
for themselves and their families. In addition to this, for the SPDC to acquire
land for such large-scale ventures, plantations, paddy fields and other lands
are confiscated from farmers without adequate compensation.
Though natural factors and weather conditions will inevitably affect a nation’s
food supply, all fingers point to the SPDC when discussing the root cause of
food scarcity in Burma. Through continued militarization, whether it be displacement,
forced relocation, or forced labour, the ruling military junta systematically
robs its people of their right to food, effectively starving a whole nation.
FACTS:
~ On April 28, 2004, Officer Ten Myi from Division No. 12 of the Military Training
Centre based near Pyicha village in the Palaw Township, Mergui district confiscated
46 fruit plantations, 9 cashew nut plantations and one rubber plantation from
villagers in the Pyicha relocation site. Villagers are no longer able to return
to their land but are forced to pay the government for produce cultivated in
their fields.
Burma Issues Internal Document received from source in Tenasserim Division,
June 2004.
~ On May 3, 2004, the Burmese Army, LIB (342), led by Major Yet Myi Sein ploughed
through several villagers’ plantations in order to construct a road from
Pyicha Yebu to Palaw Chaung. Naw Sha Ke said her plantation, 14 betel nut trees
and one cashew tree were destroyed in the process. Naw Sha Ke was not the only
villager whose plantation suffered because of SPDC development. She is left
to survive off what is left on her land.
Burma Issues Internal Document received from source in Tenasserim Division,
May 2004.
By A. Robb
In recent years, the Burmese regime has become ever more isolated from the
international community. Western governments, especially, have imposed tough
economic and political sanctions. Even neighbouring countries, such as normally
friendly Thailand and Malaysia, have recently criticised the SPDC over the continued
detention of Aung San Suu Kyi and the exclusion of opposition members from the
current National Convention. But there’s still one country that won’t
say anything negative about Burma’s undemocratic government, its ongoing
human rights abuses, or its serious environmental problems. China, it seems,
can be counted on to support the Burmese junta, no matter what.
Burma and China have had a very friendly relationship ever since their similar
repressions of similar democratic protests in 1988 and 1989, respectively. Burma
even expressed official ‘sympathy’ over the ‘disturbances’
at Tiananmen Square to the Chinese government. In addition, for many years now,
the Chinese government has used the threat of its Security Council veto to quash
any United Nations motion condemning Burma for any of its human rights abuses.
This has prevented any meaningful action on the part of the United Nations towards
changes in Burma.
Chinese interests in Burma range from geopolitical strategising, to border control,
to a need for natural resources. As China’s worldwide influence grows,
it is attempting to consolidate its dominance of Asia, and Burma is a convenient
gateway to both Southeast Asia and the Indian Subcontinent. In return for military
assistance and over US$200 million in annual economic aide, and the construction
of ports and other facilities in Burma, China gains access to the Bay of Bengal—which
would otherwise be dominated by Asian rival India—along with the right
to military or economic use of the facilities it helps build. On the other side
of Burma, ever since a 2000 agreement between countries in the region, China
is sponsoring a huge development project on the Mekong, blasting large portions
of the river to make it more navigable for its larger ships, so as to gain access
to shipping routes in Southeast Asia1. Less substantial, but still significant,
development is taking place along the Irrawaddy and Salween rivers (that lead
to the Bay of Bengal), partly at the behest of Chinese industry. Southeast Asian
nations, including Burma, appear more than willing to accommodate Chinese transportation
needs in return for increased business, along these routes, from the economic
giant.
More than any other form of aide, however, it is Chinese military support that
has made the most difference to the SPDC. It is estimated that a staggering
US$2 billion worth of recent arms packages2 have flowed from Beijing to Rangoon.
This money has allowed the Burmese military to increase its ranks from 180,000
soldiers just a few years ago, to 450,000 today. It is fair to say that this
aide has enabled the SPDC to survive based on its military might alone, as there
has been little social or economic progress of any kind in Burma, and the government
is widely-hated by the population. However, for strategic reasons, the Chinese
government desires stability in the region, and appears willing to continue
to subsidise the present Burmese leadership, just to discourage any destabilising
shift in the regional status quo.
In Burma’s northeast, towards the long border between the two countries,
China exerts a targeted influence. Effectively patrolling such a border, especially
since much of it is rough, wild terrain, would be extremely difficult. So to
protect the border from ‘undesirable’ crossings from Burma—refugees,
drugs, and weapons—unofficial Chinese policy seems to involve sending
comparatively moneyed immigrants into Burma to take control of the border states
of Shan and Kachin, from within. In these areas, Chinese immigrants seem to
dominate many aspects of the economy, and especially of Burma’s increasingly
important underground economy, which consists of illegal logging and mining,
illegal trade in drugs, arms, and sex, and the gambling that has become so popular
among Thai and Chinese tourists. Although many of these businesses are largely
run by and for the Chinese, they function by reliance on cheap Burmese labour.
The Chinese government exploits this indirect influence abroad, which allows
it to monitor and maintain an economic and political atmosphere that discourages
illegal or undesirable border crossings.
China’s economic presence in northeastern Burma also serves to ensure
a steady flow of the natural resources which the fast-growing Chinese economy
is devouring at an amazing rate. Along with Thailand, China consumes the vast
majority of Burma’s vast forestry and mineral resources, which most Burmese
are too poor to take advantage of themselves.
The SPDC government appears unconcerned by the apparent threat to Burmese sovereignty
constituted by the influx of Chinese interests into Burma. Perhaps this is not
so surprising, since the SPDC never had much control over Kachin and Shan states
to begin with—the ethnic minority groups there maintain many of their
own policies. What is more, if the Chinese are to exercise unofficial influence
over parts of the region, at least they will allow the SPDC de jure control—that
is, they will not humiliate it by officially proclaiming their own control.
The minority groups might act differently.
Burmese people in regions close to the Chinese border, on the other hand, are
understandably less comfortable with the increasing foreign presence in their
traditional territories. At the most immediate level, recent reports describe
rising real estate prices in northeastern cities, to the point where long-time
residents are being forced into satellite towns and villages, while the main
cities begin to look like Chinese colony-towns3. This is due to the influx of
relatively wealthy Chinese entrepreneurs, who are able to afford prices far
above what the locals can pay. And even while prices go up, Burmese employment
tends to suffer in areas with significant Chinese populations: although many
Chinese industries rely on Burmese labour, the influx of cheap, Chinese-produced
goods has cut deeply into the local manufacturing sector.
The encroachment into Burmese lands of Chinese interests could also have a more
intangible, but still serious effect on locals. Especially for members of ethnic
minority groups, the Chinese influence represents yet another layer of control
over their ancestral land and heritage. The Shan and Kachin people have already
spent decades under the control of colonial powers, and then under a hostile,
central Burmese government. Now they must suffer another foreign power dictating
how and where they will live, and by what means they make their living. The
removal of self-control ever further from the grassroots is an unfortunate trend,
but one which seems prevalent throughout Burma, as the governing generals become
more and more desperate to perpetuate their power, by any means they can find.
None of this is to blame the Chinese people for the difficult situation in which
Burmese people find themselves. Indeed, most Chinese are victims of government
chauvinism and injustice in the same way as the Burmese are: in China, like
Burma, a relatively small group of people are profiting while huge numbers of
rural villagers live in dire poverty and repression. Chinese people, including
those living in Burma, are more aware of the problems caused by their government’s
policies than anyone else. Reports indicate rising Burmese anti-Chinese sentiment,
related to the common consensus that Beijing is a major force behind the SPDC’s
continued survival. This sentiment may unfortunately be transferred from the
unelected Chinese government responsible for the problems, to the Chinese people
as a whole.
Unfortunately, there are no simple solutions to the problem of exploitative
Chinese involvement in Burma. China, as both one of the most important countries
in the world, and one of the most repressive, appears invulnerable to international
criticism. And no matter how isolated Burma becomes from the international community,
Chinese aide alone would appear to be enough to prop up the SPDC indefinitely.
China, with its Security Council veto and ongoing financial and military assistance,
seems effectively to undermine widespread international criticism of and sanctions
against Burma. And the Chinese presence inside Burma, both in the form of development
projects that allow China access to Burma’s strategic and natural resources,
and in the form of business persons and interests on the Burmese side of the
border, works against the empowerment of grassroots people.
However, there is another possibility, even if it is a remote one: that the
Chinese government could provide an opportunity for freedom and democracy in
Burma. As the one country that could support Burma, seemingly more than any
other, it could also impose the most effective pressure. Often overlooked is
the fact that China was one of the first countries to congratulate Aung San
Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy on its victory in 1990 elections
in Burma. Many exiled Burmese dissidents were given asylum in China, and still
live there peacefully. Perhaps there is a chance that the Chinese government
is not committed to the current Burmese leadership as much as it is to regional
stability. And Burma would certainly be more stable with an accountable, widely
supported government in Rangoon.
Endnotes:
1 “The Rape of a River” Bangkok Post, January 5, 2003.
2 “Burma: Feel-Good US Sanctions Wrongheaded,” YaleGlobal Online,
May 19, 2004
3 “Sowing Disorder” China Rights Forum Journal, May 2003.