ASEAN's goal as an organisation is to promote economic growth among its members, while at the same time securing peace and security in the South East Asia area. It also acts as the forum through which the region promotes itself to the rest of Asia, Europe and the US. There are currently 10 members, with Burma having joined in 1997.

Burma's membership has caused major problems for ASEAN's relations with its dialogue partners. The lead-up to last summer's ASEM Summit meeting between ASEAN and the European Union (EU) was a diplomatic nightmare, with several European countries unwilling to attend if Burma participated. In the end a compromise was reached whereby the EU accepted Burma into ASEM on condition that Rangoon sent only a low-level delegation to the Summit in Vietnam. Surely this was just a small taste of what lies around the corner next year when Burma takes over the ASEAN Chair and hosts the ASEAN Regional Forum. The US can be expected to be similarly unwilling to deal with the junta, having already taken a harder line than the EU in relation to sanctions.

ASEAN members are certainly aware of the problems that lie ahead for the bloc unless a dramatic change takes place in Burma. They must also realise that they are well placed to exert pressure on the regime, which appears to be far more interested in the views of its neighbours than in those of the US or the EU. Sanctions imposed by western countries have so far proven ineffectual in bringing real change for the people of Burma. The mass release of thousands of prisoners just before last November's ASEAN meeting in Vientiane, Laos, showed on the other hand that the generals are eager to please ASEAN countries.

All this begs the question of why then, if it is in the interests of the bloc as a whole, more pressure has not been put on Rangoon to take meaningful steps in the direction of reform. The short answer is ASEAN's principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of its members. This shield from criticism has been wielded in the past by strongmen such as Suharto of Indonesia and Marcos of the Philippines. More recently, at last November's meeting, Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra threatened to walk out if the issue of the ongoing violence in Thailand's southern provinces was raised.

With Burma, ASEAN had hoped that a policy of "constructive engagement" would slowly encourage Rangoon to open up its political system. This approach has been a great boon for Burma's generals, allowing them to participate in ASEAN despite ongoing appalling human rights abuses and a farcical "roadmap to democracy". Non-interference means that Burma's internal affairs are effectively untouchable.

The issue for ASEAN now is just how important the principle of non-interference is. Is it worth retaining even when it means that the bloc's effectiveness and significance on the international stage is jeopardised? It appears that ASEAN members are no longer willing to turn a blind eye towards what is happening in Burma, and there may be limits to exactly what the junta can get away with.

The mass release of prisoners announced by Rangoon just before the Vientiane ASEAN Summit was widely praised, in Asia and beyond. ASEAN responded by keeping the appalling situation inside Burma out of the final summit communiqué. However, just before the end of the last day of the meeting, reports began to circulate that the Burmese authorities had extended the house arrest of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi. The timing of the move, and the refusal of Burma's Prime Minister Soe Win to confirm it in Vientiane, was a remarkable stab in the back for ASEAN countries, many of whom have long pushed for the release of the Nobel Peace Laureate, showing just how confident the junta is that it can act with complete impunity.

ASEAN governments were quick to respond. On the Monday after the Summit, Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar told reporters in Kuala Lumpur that Burma should release Suu Kyi to convince the international community that it remains serious about bringing democracy to the country. ''Myanmar [Burma] has re-affirmed [its] commitment towards democratization...but they have never spoken about the release of Aung San Suu Kyi,'' said Syed Hamid. Indonesia's foreign ministry spokesman Marty Natalegawa similarly accused Burma of dodging the issue of Suu Kyi's release. Although falling short of a stern rebuke, the reactions did show that there is a growing sense of frustration with Rangoon's antics.

More trenchant criticism came from an ASEAN inter-parliamentary workshop held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, at the same time as the Vientiane Summit. The caucus involved elected representatives from Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, Cambodia, and Singapore. They released a statement saying that "The chairmanship of Asean cannot be awarded to Myanmar in 2006, without undergoing systemic and irreversible change in its governance." The group even went as far as calling for "an immediate review of Myanmar's membership of ASEAN."

More recently the group of legislators has denounced the ongoing constitution-drafting National Convention as a sham, and national representatives have vowed to push their own governments to tell Rangoon that it must release Aung San Suu Kyi and to make real moves towards democracy before being allowed to take over the ASEAN Chair. In early February, the caucus discussed sending a mission to Rangoon to evaluate the country’s situation by talking to the generals and Suu Kyi, although the Burmese authorities turned down the idea, saying such a visit was inappropriate while the National Convention was meeting.

It would appear therefore that the principle of non-interference may not be as firmly entrenched as it once was. Constructive engagement has been a failure with Burma. ASEAN has tough questions to answer before 2006. Is it desirable to have a brutal military regime chairing the group? Is the non-interference approach still sustainable?

The vision of an ASEAN community repeatedly endorsed in Summits is to achieve a single market by 2020, with a free flow of people, goods, services and investment in a region encompassing more than 500 million people and annual trade totalling US$720 billion. ASEAN may have lessons to learn here from the EU, a grouping that is further along the spectrum of integration. As with ASEAN, the EU originally focused on purely economic goals. Since then, however, the aims of the organisation have gone far beyond the merely economic, and it has become a truly political union. As a consequence, human rights have found their way onto the agenda of community institutions.

The most recent EU Constitutional Treaty includes a Charter of Fundamental Rights for citizens, and, perhaps most interestingly for ASEAN, a specific provision whereby a member state's membership rights can be suspended where there is a clear risk of a serious breach of certain fundamental Union values, namely, "respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights." Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights is also effectively a prerequisite for new member states.

If ASEAN aspires to follow a similar path in relation to integration, it should consider including human rights in its remit. In any case, to have Burma as the Chair of the organisation would be disastrous for the group, not just from a human rights perspective, but also in economic terms. If it is to have international credibility it must recognise that it has a responsibility to take action against Burma. The junta derives legitimacy from its participation in ASEAN. In exerting its influence on the Burmese regime, ASEAN would be advancing its own interests while also seizing a real opportunity to jolt the junta into taking action. Hiding behind a policy of non-interference is just not good enough. The generals should not be allowed to take the ASEAN Chair unless dramatic changes take place in the country before next year.