The decades of civil war between Shan, Wa and the Burmese government and the dozens of military alliances and break away factions secessions, together with the prevalence of drug barons and freedom fighters make it quasi impossible to get a clear overview of the whole situation in Shan State. From an outsider’s perspective, the recent political and military manoeuvres reinforce the complex nature of Shan State insurgency. Are these series of events part of a global strategy of the political and military Shan leadership or are they simply a succession of random actions? What are the possible repercussions be for the whole Shan community? What consequences will such actions have at the national level?

The ethnic insurgency in Shan State

Map of the Thai-Burma Border with Shan State, April 2005, S.H.A.N.

Ethnic insurgency in Shan State started in the 1950’s following the refusal of Rangoon leaders to honour the Panglong Agreement of 1947. This granted independence to Burma and regional autonomy within ten years to ethnic States. Since that time various ethnic groups, such as the Wa, Shan, Pa-O have fought the Rangoon government and its army in Shan State.

One of the largest groups was Khun Sa’s Mong Thai Army (MTA) operating in the notorious Golden triangle region, where Burma, Thailand and Laos share borders. The MTA was formed in April 1985 following the union of two Shan armed groups: Khun Sa’s Shan United Army (SUA) and the Shan United Revolutionary Army (SURA) led by Yord Sek, today leader of the Shan State Army-South.

When the two groups allied, the opium warlord Khun Sa took over leadership of the whole group by gathering a strong military wing estimated to be around 10,000 soldiers in arms. The MTA soon became one of the most powerful opposition groups fighting Burmese troops but also one of the biggest criminal organisations that Rangoon had ever faced. The MTA was also the strongest ethnic army fighting the military forces of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) active in Shan State.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Wa troops formed the backbone of CPB forces. When the CPB collapsed in March 1989, four main factions emerged following ethnic and military criteria. Among them was the Wa represented by the Burma Democracy Solidarity Party (BDSP). The Wa BDSP forces took over the CPB headquarters at Panghsang on the Chinese border. In May 1989, they agreed to a cease-fire with Rangoon. This agreement authorised Wa leaders to keep their troops in arms, to control their own territory and to do business with China. Burmese troops were not allowed to enter Wa territory without permission from the group. In November 1989, the Wa BDSP established the United Wa State Party (UWSP) and its army (UWSA), approximately 16,000 troops, settled in Northern Shan State.

IDP family, Southern Shan State, 2005, BI

The cease-fire agreement and the well organised Northern and Southern UWSA Command opened the way for massive expansion of heroin production and traffic.

It was not until 1993-1994 that the UWSA moved into the less complex methamphetamines production. The drug empire expanded quickly from UWSA stronghold in Panghsang to a new frontier along the Thai-Burmese border. This evolution led to an inevitable war between Wa troops and its main business rival, the Mong Tai Army (MTA) led by Khun Sa.

In the early 90s, in an attempt to offer a better image to the international community, Rangoon government decided to crack down on Khun Sa’s increasingly powerful MTA and its drug empire. With a large number of rebel groups which had already agreed to a cease-fire, the Burmese Army was able to concentrate its military offensives on MTA territory by using the United Wa State Army (UWSA) as a proxi army.

Unable to cope with two fronts, Khun Sa surrendered in January 1996. Following this defeat, the UWSA took over some MTA border territory. Many MTA soldiers were caught by surprise by Khun Sa’s decision and also surrendered. However, a large contingent of ex-MTA soldiers refused this state of fact and decided to continue the armed struggle. Led by Colonel Yord Sek, around 1000 soldiers regrouped themselves in a new army known today as the Shan State Army-South (SSA-South).

Until recently, the SSA-South was the only Shan army resisting the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the Burmese government. Rangoon has responded with a brutal military campaign which continues today targeting civilians as well as soldiers. Around 300,000 people have been forced to relocate in order to cut off support for SSA-South troops.

In late 1996, SSA-South leaders moved north from the former MTA areas along the Thai-Burma border to ask for support from other Shan insurrection groups: the Shan State Army-North (Shan State Army) and the Shan State Army-Central (better known as the Shan State National Army). Both had agreed to a cease-fire with the Rangoon government respectively in 1989 and 1995. Despite many proposals from SSA-South for a cease-fire with Rangoon, they were always rejected by the government and they warned the other two not to contact or assist the SSA-South.

However, in September 1997, the leaders of the three Shan groups met and agreed to merge as a new Shan State Army (SSA) hoping to negotiate a cease-fire agreement for the SSA-South under SSA’s umbrella. But, the Burmese government never recognised this union and refused to negotiate any cease-fire. Under such pressure from the SPDC, the agreement was never acted upon and only existed on paper.

Throughout the late 1990’s until today, the SPDC engaged violent campaigns against SSA-South troops with the cooperation of the United Wa State Army (UWSA). The fighting on several occasions spilled over into Thailand and in 2002, brought the two countries to the brink of war.

The recent conflict between the USWA and the SSA-South

Three years on, the situation has not improved. The war between SPDC (allied with the UWSA) against the SSA-South and the multiple human rights violations that derive from it are still the common fate of millions of civilians living in Shan State.

The warfare between these groups has reached a worrying intensity over the last three months. On March 13, 2005, the UWSA Southern Command led by drug lord Wei Hsuehkang launched a military offensive against the SSA-South’s military base of Loi Taileng, opposite Pang Mapha district, Mae Hong Son Province, in Thailand.

After a missed attempt of negotiation, the conflict dramatically escalated in mid-April. Reinforced by troops coming from Mongton and Monghsat, the Wa attackers were able to launch successive human wave charges against Shan positions causing high casualties among Wa troops. In mid-April, the Shan base was also heavily pounded with more than 2,000 82mm and 120mm mortars shells fired by the UWSA over two days. To estimate the number of casualties of such a battle is difficult. According to a SSA-South liaison officer who talked to Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN), Wa casualties reached nearly 120 dead and 170 wounded from April 12-14. On the SSA-South side, only three were killed and 21 wounded. In mid-May, independent sources estimated that the conflict has resulted in more than 700 casualties on both sides.

According to some reports, SPDC troops were not directly involved in the battle at the beginning of the offensive, but had promised to support Wa operations with supplies, ammunition and artillery. After the heavy bombing of mid-April, an SSA-South liaison officer noted “the Wa appear to be enjoying unlimited access to both firepower and manpower,’ confirming SPDC’s apparent support. At the end of April, Nam Khur Hsen, SSA-South Spokeswoman said that the Burmese Army was now fighting alongside the UWSA forces.

SSA-South Soldiers, Southern Shan State, 1991, BI

During the same period, the UWSA and SPDC troops also harassed villages sympathetic to the SSSA-South. According to the Free Burma Rangers, a independent Thai-based organization that provided emergency help to people living in ethnic areas in Burma, the Shan village of Nam Mal Tee was attacked with rifle and machinegun fire in March resulting in the death of three civilians including one 13 year-old girl. Located in the north of the SSA-South base, this village and many others were caught in crossfire.

The outbreak of violence in the area forced nearly 2,000 people to flee their homes and live in hiding. On April 22, these internal displaced people (IDPs) were finally offered shelter on Thai soil after some UWSA mortar shells fell close to the IDPs settlement. In the past, Thailand has refused to shelter Shan people as refugees. However, it was specified in this case, that once the situation returns to normal, all displaced villagers would have to cross back into Burma. What these people will find once they return to their home is mostly unsure. During similar military campaigns, villages were frequently burnt down, rice paddies and other crops were destroyed and surrounded areas ruined with landmines.

The conflict could have spilled dangerously into Thai territory. To prevent any spread of violence, Thai Third Army Commander Lt-Gen Picharnmeth Muangmanee warned in mid-April that any intrusion by foreign troops into Thailand would be swiftly countered. He also denied Rangoon’s allegation that the Thai army was supporting the SSA-South, allowing them to use Thai soil to attack Burmese border troops.

According to the Bangkok Post, Thai PM Thaksin Shinawatra, asked the Third Army to handle the problem carefully but to solve it at the local level. With sources reporting that at least 30 shells fell inside Thai territory, to resolve the problem “locally” seems a relatively smooth approach for a Prime Minister better known for his fierce methods in tackling key issues. Thai territory has been under fire, however, keeping a fruitful relationship with Rangoon seems once again more crucial for the Thai government.

Being on more familiar ground, Lt-Gen Picharnmeth Muangmanee feared that the UWSA secretly agreed with Rangoon that if this offensive was successful, Wa rebels would be allowed to keep SSA-South territory to produce drugs while enjoying larger access to Thailand to ship them. “If the UWSA could take control of Loi Taileng, it would definitely worsen the drug trafficking situation along the border area,’’ Lt-Gen Picharmeth said.

Not surprisingly, the official reasons brought by UWSA leaders for this offensive were of a different nature. The UWSA accused the SSA-South of repeated defamation of the Wa organisation, abducting eight people in February who were under Wa protection, attacking Wa convoys, and of seizing a watercourse used by Wa bases on the Thai-Burma border.

However, reading between the lines of all the allegations, the hypothesis advanced by the Thai Third Army Commander seems the most plausible. For years, UWSA warfare has been an efficient and well recognized method of shipping drugs to the Thai border. The possible deal between drug baron Wei Hsuehkang, UWSA Southern Command, and Rangoon government has been confirmed by different sources. Indeed facts already seem to prove that the main reason for this offensive was drug business. An expert security officer told SHAN on April 12, “We have received reports that the Wa had cleared out the last of their stock in Panghsang (USWA main headquarters) recently.” The shipment brought to the border was said to have amounted to between 1.4 and 2 tons of heroin and up to 30 million methamphetamine pills.

The Wa appear to be enjoying unlimited access to both firepower and manpower

SSA Office, April 2005

Based in Panghsang headquarters, the UWSA’s Supreme Commander, Bao Youxiang, had previously denied any direct involvement in the UWSA southern command attack. Yet, Bao Youxiang has also promised for years to make UWSA areas along the Chinese border a “drug-free” zone by the end of 2005. The deadline set for this is June, 26 2005. Hence, all in all, both Bao Youxiang and Wei Hsuehkang needed this war to protect and expand their drug business to other areas. If these massive amounts of drugs were successful in being shipped into Thailand, we can imagine the deadly effects on the Thai population, the outrageous profits raised from their sale, and the benefits to criminal organisations at the local and regional levels.

Shan opposition groups reunited to fight SPDC

In mid May as the UWSA was finally withdrawing from the battlefield another event shook the Shan insurrection scene, adding only more confusion to it. In an unprecedented move, a Shan ceasefire group announced that they were breaking their cease-fire agreement with Rangoon and allied with the SSA-South.

Rangoon’s ongoing campaign to disarm ceasefire groups and the fact that SPDC troops intensified their operations and human rights violations in Shan State, may explain why after 15 years of ceasefire, Col. Sai Yi and his Shan State National Army (SSNA) decided to merge with the SSA-South to pick up the armed struggle.

The reunification between the two groups is not only now on paper but also on the ground. It is difficult to know how many troops are merging together under a new SSA, but Thai securities officials estimated that the SSNA may have between 2,000-3,000 soldiers in arms and that the SSA-South is made of approximately 2,000 combatants. All together, this new Shan army may not look as powerful as the UWSA but if their alliance lasts, they will represent one of the biggest active opposition groups along with the Karen National Union (KNU).

According to Col. Sai Yi from the former SSNA, it is Rangoon that has broken the ceasefire pact by applying increasing pressure on them and other ceasefire groups to disarm. In February this year, Rangoon also refused to consider the proposal of a federal union that the SSNA along with 13 other groups presented at the military-organised National Convention. Their open participation at the convention led to the February crackdown in Rangoon on Shan political leaders. During an interview with the BBC, Sai Yi said “If a federal arrangement is unacceptable to the Burmese military, we have no choice but to fight for independence.”

Shan Independence declaration

Reinforcing the general disobedience, some Shan leaders have decided not to fight anymore for independence but just too simply declare it as a given fact. Indeed, following the crackdown on Shan leaders in February, a group of elderly Shan activists living in exile in Canada declared the independence of Shan State and the creation of a Shan interim government on April 17. According to SHAN, they claimed to have received the support of 48 out of 58 townships in Shan State. This secessionist move has been met with criticism and dismay by many other Shan leaders and Shan human rights groups. This announcement indeed could incite the Rangoon government to crack down even more on Shan activists. Fears were also raised that more SPDC troops would be sent to Shan State to counter attack any spreading of separatist fervour among Shan population. Once again, Shan people will become the direct target of Rangoon government and its army.

All these recent events and makeovers do not indicate a bright future for Shan State. Obviously, Shan insurgency will escalate to a deadlier level with the two Shan armies re-grouping in a context of secessionist movement. But that is maybe what the SPDC hardliner government has wished for months. It just gives them the best reason to deploy more troops, launch large scale offensives in Shan ethnic areas, and fully wipe out any dissidence. This is also particularly worrying in the light of the recent report released on May 27, by the US-based rights group Human Rights Watch. This report accused the Burmese army to have waged a campaign of torture, rape and execution against ethnic Shan villagers during the last military offensive of these three months in Lois Taileng. If more troops are sent into the area, the worse can be expected for local people living there.

Another alarming trend mentioned by many activists based on the Thai-Burma border is the possibility that other ceasefire groups may follow SSNA’s move. With ongoing pressure from Rangoon to force ceasefire groups to surrender their arms, it is highly possible that these groups will face no other choice but to join the armed struggle again. According to the Irrawaddy magazine, a high-ranking officer from the pro-Rangoon Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) said that the group is indeed facing continuous pressure from Rangoon to lay down their arms, despite their ceasefire agreement of 1994. This is something they are firmly opposed to and it may be the case that the group will again fight SPDC troops alongside with the Karen National Union (KNU). Our own sources confessed that the KNU would be ready to welcome DKBA fighters back into its ranks.

If the ethnic insurgency redoubles in Shan State but also in Karen state and maybe in other regions, Burma will have to again face decades of civil war where the only victims are people from all ethnic backgrounds: Shan, Karen, Wa, Pa-O, Palaung and Burmese...

When a government continuously oppresses democratic opposition leaders and never recognises their rights, turning any possible political settlement to grains of dust; when a national army endlessly terrorizes its population and increases its pressure over armed groups who had agreed to cease armed struggle, the only thing we can expect in return is violence, unrest and civil war.

However, is this not what the Burmese government really wishes? Sadly we can only assume so.

Latest Update:

On May 30, just at the time to print this newsletter, Thai troops ordered the hundreds of Shan refugees taking shelter near Loi Taileng on Thailand's border to return home. The move was aimed at showing that Thailand would not allow anti-Burma forces to operate from its territory. But the Shan Women's Action Network has urged the Thai government to reconsider its order to push back in war zone mostly children and women from the SSA-South base of Lor Taileng. No deadline has been set.

A Thai General was quoted saying "It isnot time to use cannons to disperse them yet."