On October 24, 2004, General Than
Shwe undertook the first visit to India
by a Burmese head of state for 25 years. Topics under discussion included hydro electric power, cultural exchanges and border security. The carefully choreographed photographs of Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, and the Junta’s most senior officer smiling and shaking hands indicated further the realization of what an official from India’s Ministry of External affairs called “a mutual desire to establish a long term cooperative partnership.”
Human rights groups and activists in India and abroad condemned the meeting. Prior to this, Burmese Prime Minister Lieut. General Soe Win publicly stated “not only will (the junta) never talk to the National League for Democracy (NLD), but also will never hand power over to the NLD.” Considering this comment it seems difficult to fathom how the world’s largest democracy can continue to promote the validity of such a barbaric dictatorship.
Between 1991-92 and 2001-02, bilateral trade between the two countries grew from $74.8 m into some $428m
However, this situation had not always been the official line. In 1988, under the premiership of Rajiv Gandhi, India morally supported the pro democracy forces. Requests from the Indian government for Aung San Suu Kyi’s release also irked the Burmese government at this time. The 1990’s though seemed to bring a volte face in Indian attitudes to their pariah neighbour. In reality this is a minor exaggeration, cooperation had existed in one form or another despite soured diplomatic relations. Indeed, a border agreement was signed in 1967 and maritime boundaries between Burma and India were defined by a maritime delimitation act in 1986.
Close ties have existed for centuries between the two, the spread of Buddhism from India in the 3rd century AD, established an early bond. A shared experience of British Colonial rule meant links were still present in the 20th century. India’s Foreign Minister at the opening of the Indo-Myanmar friendship bridge in 2001, spoke of this new connection as a continuation of social and spiritual linkages. Indeed this brand new 160km road and bridge linking Moreh in Manipur State, Northeastern India with Kalewa on the Chindwin River in Burma, was perhaps a striking symbol just how close the two had become.
In 1992 India commenced its “Look East Policy”, which was aimed at seeking new economic partners and markets abroad. South East Asia with its “Tiger” economies became a major target. It was at this time that India’s conduct toward Burma really took on new significance. To put it mildly, Burma was now vital in furthering India’s commercial interests in the region and vice versa. The 1643 km shared land border in India’s Northeast provided the opportunity of more road links from the subcontinent. Chief Minister of Manipur State Okram Singh noted “the North East could well turn out to be a gateway to South East Asia.” Since that time trade and commerce between Burma and India has developed considerably. Between 1991-92 and 2001-02 bilateral trade between the two countries grew from $74.8m to some $428m1. India is now Burma’s biggest exporter, absorbing a quarter of its exports, primarily iron and steel products and pharmaceuticals2.
However recently there has been some disquiet in particular from the Indian side about the volume of trade between India and Burma. Mangi Singh, Trade and Commerce Minister for Manipur State noted India’s export growth lies at just 7% against the import growth of 32% from Burma. He has called for the central governments of India and Burma to take a more pro active role in boosting the trade between the two, to provide more security for traders from insurgents in the area and to halt illegal trade in such items as medicine, cosmetics and garments3. It seems the region has not become the success story the Indians would have wished. Security as well as trade was supposed to improve, yet militant activity still persists. The benefits in this instance appear to be one sided in Burma’s favour. They now have a huge customer for their exports and have certainly gained in the public relations stakes from dealing with the world’s largest democracy.
Also crucial to understanding the increased contact between India and Burma is the ideal of “Constructive Engagement”. This gradualist approach involves talking and trading with Burma whilst simultaneously trying to persuade them to democratize and end human rights abuses4. The policy was introduced by the Thai government in 1991. Its regionalization culminated in 1997 with Burma being granted full membership of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).
Table on Burma-India Trade (in US$ million)
Year
Exports to India
Imports from India
Total
1985-86
29.98
0.80
30.78
1991-92
51.37
23.46
74.83
1995-96
164.57
54.74
219.31
2000-01
261.99
83.16
345.15
2001-02
345.74
82.26
428
India following the lead of its South East Asian counterparts, with whom since 2002 it has enjoyed a particularly close relationship, is certainly taking advantage of this policy in an economic sense. The proposed Burma-India Pipeline being a case in point. It is intended that this project, set to run from Sittwe in Arakan State in Burma, passing through Bangladesh to Calcutta5, will be a vital source of energy for India. However moral questions have also arisen. There have been warnings that the human cost may be high. In the construction of the Yadana pipeline between Thailand and Burma, built by foreign companies UNOCAL and TOTAL, the use of unpaid porters and villagers for construction work was commonplace. Both Amnesty International and The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions have warned of the dangers of similar forms of forced labour being used in the India-Burma project. There are fears of serious human rights violations. A representative from the latter noted “we cannot imagine that there will not be forced labour at some point.”6
Furthermore there has essentially been no development of a more inclusive government strategy from the military leaders of Burma. There have been no apparent moves toward democracy, despite what some argued after Burma relinquished the Chairmanship of ASEAN. All signs suggest they are becoming even more centralized and intransigent. All outside influence is being silenced, as shown by the fact that UN and NGO operations are being curtailed by government activities. The International Labour Organisation, a leading campaigner against forced labour are said to be on the brink of expulsion from the country. All dissent is being silenced and the grip on power by the few is tightening6. This illustrates the failure of “Constructive Engagement”. Essentially it gives tacit consent to the governments’ activities and provides easy answers to complex questions about the justification of milking economic benefits from a resource rich but fundamentally amoral regime. India, a proponent of the policy has to be considered a big culprit of this.
As with so many other issues in the region, the “China factor” should not be discounted. China strategically embraced Burma in the late 1980’s, providing it with sizeable military supplies. India at this time still advocated a pro democracy stance and this allowed the Chinese to establish a strategic foothold in Burma. Since then Beijing has contributed heavily to modernizing its neighbour’s infrastructure, including the building of three roads from different districts of Yunnan province to Burmese towns and is planning to build a 1350km railway from Kunming going through Laos and Burma to Bangkok.
China has also been a very aggressive player in infiltrating South East Asian markets, this situation was propelled by the ASEAN-China Free trade agreement in 2000. India since moving away from its previous stance of non engagement is now attempting to challenge its major regional rival, by developing major infrastructure and trade deals of its own with Burma, and so in turn is looking to expand its interests in South East Asia. Growing Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean should not be discounted when considering the development of Indo-Burma relations. As the Chinese seek strategic outposts on Burmese Islands, good relations with the owners of these islands are obviously in India’s interests.
Whatever the justifications behind India’s collusion with the Burmese government, whether the argument should be about improving domestic security, addressing an energy crisis, or counteracting Chinese dominance, they are inherently all to do with national ambitions. The benefits they are seeking are there for everyone to see. India is becoming a vast global player, and it is looking to cement and improve this position. However with this power, as the well worn cliché goes, comes responsibility. Being the “world’s largest democracy” what India should ultimately stand for is an adherence to the principles of democracy. The friendly, “smile for the cameras” relationship between India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and General Than Shwe stresses something to the contrary. Essentially that principles such as human rights, and democratic processes mean very little to India, particularly if there is economic gain to be made.
Endnotes:
Figures from http://www.indianbusiness.nic.in/commercial-relation/myanmar.htm
Perspective on Myanmar-India relatons, Dr Udai Bhanu Singh, Dialouge vol 5 no.3, March 2004
Militancy, bands hit Indo Burmese trade, Mizzima News, July 8, 2004
Why Intervention in Burma is an Urgent Need, Burma Today News, July 28, 2005
Proposed Pipeline Causes Concern, The Irrawaddy, July 12, 2005
Ibid
Generals strengthen their hold on power, Bangkok Post, July 22, 2005
Between 1991-92 and 2001-02, bilateral trade between the two countries grew from $74.8 m into some $428m
