Despite the deteriorating humanitarian situation, the junta has been consistently more interested in financing military projects than social services. The paranoia of the SPDC, stemming primarily from the political system it operates within, has placed it in a dilemma. While the SPDC wants to increase humanitarian aid to assuage internal unrest, it simultaneously wishes to limit the potential influence that foreign agencies might have on the internal affairs of the country.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have attempted to partially fill the huge gap in social services, consequently mitigating some of the humanitarian fallout of poor government provisions. Aid agencies have attempted to address the humanitarian situation in the country by introducing projects to provide social services. International NGOs and aid agencies like the UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO, ILO, Care, World Vision and the UN Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (hereafter the Global Fund) have invested large amounts of money and effort into developing a better network of aid provision. Targeted areas have included education and health care systems, access to food and clean water, and human and labour rights programs.

International aid agencies involved in Burma must confront the humanitarian problem and a political system that serves to enrich and consolidate military power at the expense of humanitarian concerns. A paradoxical situation emerges whereby the resources and legitimacy that international humanitarian aid brings to the country are manipulated for the benefit of the very regime that perpetuates the crisis. The SPDC’s disregard for humanitarian issues ensures that international assistance remains a stopgap measure. Also, the Burmese governments’ continuing actions vis-à-vis the populace creates new humanitarian problems. The humanitarian assistance that does actually come into the country reaches only a small minority of those in need.

The military regime in Burma has oppressed the populace in order to maintain control in the face of a clear lack of popular domestic support and international legitimacy. This system of oppression simultaneously foments paranoia about potential dissent. The junta’s insecurity has led it to violently enforce conformity with its ideas and values. This is done through constant control by the central authority of the country’s social, political, and communicative elements. The junta is not only worried about internal unrest but also extremely distrustful of outside influences that do not match their political and social ideology. It tries to avoid or minimize external influences like non-governmental organisations as much as possible. The SDPC fears such organisations because of the critical perspectives that they may encourage in the domestic populace as well as their influence over the internal affairs of the country. As a result, the junta has sought to establish firm control over foreign agencies working in Burma.

The SPDC’s strategy for engaging foreign organisations includes systematic obstructions to the implementation of aid programs. These need to be understood in relation to the paradoxical attitude that the SPDC holds towards humanitarian agencies. An understanding of the connection between state perception and policies would allow international organisations to more adequately evaluate their role in the country and in turn develop strategies to more effectively reach their target populations.

One obstacle present in SPDC policies on foreign aid is the lack of cooperation with the regime itself. The junta is simultaneously the sole conduit for humanitarian aid as well as being a primary root cause of the humanitarian problem. Many human rights abuses, such as food scarcity and forced displacement are the result of SPDC military policies, especially in parts of the country with an active armed opposition.

Another impediment to international organisations is the level of restriction placed on the movement of NGO workers and the issues in which they may engage. Such constraints are ensured by a government counterpart assigned to work alongside foreign aid programmes. Furthermore, the Memoranda of Understanding that aid agencies must sign with the government of Burma restricts them from working in ‘political’ or ‘religious’ fields2. The junta’s perception of what constitutes the 'political’ blocks many of the conventional means of implementing aid programs. For example, NGOs are consistently denied permission to access and work in the remote ethnic areas, which represent some of the locations of greatest need, due to their political sensitivity. Even where aid workers are allowed to travel, they must often be accompanied by governmental representatives and occasionally by ‘experts’ who observe and report on NGO activities. This hinders contact and openness between the Burmese population and foreign aid workers.

A further obstruction to international aid work is the corruption of the state bureaucracy. The government requires that aid money and in-kind provisions be channelled through state agencies; a process that takes it through several departments and the hands of several state or local politicians. In this process, government and military leaders take ‘their quota’ from the total amount of aid finances and resources that pass through their departments. Organisations cannot control the amount of financing or goods actually getting to the people. Furthermore, what little amount does reach the intended target is embellished by the junta and promoted as coming from state initiatives. An example of this occurred in the delivery of aid to victims of a cyclone which hit the Arakan coast on May 19th, 2004. In this case, aid money and resources were sent through SPDC-backed agencies. The military forced victims to sign documents stating that they had received 20,000 kyat, when only 14,000 had been delivered and provisions of rice, cooking pots, and blankets were similarly exagerated3.

Additionally, it is impossible to get an accurate picture of the progress of an NGO’s involvement because feedback is often given by the government or state-backed organizations and informants. Those who do attempt to provide accurate information to international organisations are often at risk. Following a report published by the International Labor Organization (ILO) about military-directed forced labour, two individuals who provided relevant information were arrested under charges of treason. One was sentenced to death, although the sentence was later commuted to seven years in prison, and the other sentenced outright to 18 months imprisonment4. Furthermore, subsequent to the release of the report, the head of the ILO in Burma, Richard Horsey, and one of his staff received a number of death threats5. Such intimidation dissuades Burmese people from informing NGOs about other human right violations.

A further concern of foreign organisations in Burma is the potential raid and seizure of their offices and resources. There have been recent rumours about a potential takeover of NGO offices by the government-backed Union Solidarity and Development Association to occur in early 2006. Such possibilities put psychological pressure on international NGOs who may in turn self-restrict their programmes in order to lessen the likelihood of being raided.

These obstructions to aid work clarify why some NGOs are contemplating removing their projects from Burma. The Global Fund, for example, recently decided to quit its five-year US$98.4 million HIV/AIDS prevention program during the first year of operation because of the numerous difficulties of working within the junta’s restrictions6. Regardless of the choice that aid agencies make, the humanitarian-political dilemma remains. If foreign organisations stay, the government uses the finances and legitimacy they provide to strengthen their power. If these organisations leave, the humanitarian crisis grows and the government blames the situation on the international community. Understanding the ambiguous position of foreign humanitarian agencies in relation to the junta is fundamental to the development of more effective aid strategies. NGOs must decide whether they can, and want, to deal with a junta that perpetuates the humanitarian crisis. For those agencies that decide to maintain their projects in Burma, there may be room to manoeuvre if the present challenges are taken into account. For example, strengthing the present NGO network could assist the transfer of information and provision of aid to those in need. Some information gaps could be closed by sharing concepts, data and strategies. On this path NGOs could gain more control over their work and the humanitarian situation in Burma.

Endnotes:

1. Department for International Development (UK Government) website, November 2005
2. Purcell, Marc, 1999, ‘Axe-handles or Willing Minions?’ In Strengthening Civil Society in Burma: Possibilities and Dilemmas for International NGOs
3. “Nine Arakanese Arrested by MI for Complaining to Prime Minister Khin Nyunt”, Narinjara News, August 9th, 2004
4. “Burma junta pressurizing forced labor victims not to report the ILO”, Democratic Voice of Burma, June 3rd, 2005
5. “US leads condemnation of junta over ILO report”, Irrawaddy, October 31st, 2005
6. “Termination of Grants to Myanmar”, The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, August 18th, 2005

To go to the other articles published in the November 2005 BI Newsletter click on the links below:

Refugee Resettlement: One Step Forward or Two Steps Back?
Going Through the Process: An Insiders View