At exactly 6:37 am on Sunday November 6th, 2005 a convoy of military trucks left Rangoon carrying civil servants to the country’s newly assigned capital in a bucolic and malaria prone valley in Mandalay Division. Many of those relocating had only learned about the move three days prior. On Monday the 7th, Burma’s information minister, Brigadier General Kyaw Hsan, officially announced that the country’s capital would be a newly established city in Pyinmana District. The minister further explained that, “The reason we are moving is because Pyinmana, which is in the centre of Myanmar, is geographically and strategically located for the development of the country”1. Mass transfers continued thereafter with the stated intention of effectively relocating and opening all government ministries by January 1st, 2006.
Construction at Pyinmana began several months before November’s relocation and contractors working on the project have estimated that the kyat equivalent of millions of US dollars, an exorbitant amount in Burma, are being spent on infrastructure development. Over thirty contracting companies have been employed to construct mansions for senior generals, government offices, national headquarters for ceasefire groups and the state-backed Union Solidarity and Development Association, bunkers, tunnels, a large military hospital, apartments, airstrips, a golf course, two luxury hotels and two large supermarkets2. Analysts claim that expenses are being born by a mixture of foreign aid and domestic drug money and offset by the use of forced labour. Furthermore, land needed for the capital has been forcibly confiscated from thousands of villagers living in the area3.
There is nothing to eat, drink and nothing to buy. Just nothing
Despite the pace of construction efforts, the rush to relocate the capital at the start of November meant that much of the complex remained incomplete. Civil servants forcibly relocated to Pyinmana were deposited in a large hall and provided with food for only two days. After this they were told they would have to “fend for themselves”, although the closest food stores were 30 kilometres away4. Communication infrastructure was also incomplete and one government department had only three telephone lines for the entire ministry5. Those able to contact family members back in Rangoon mostly asked them to send food. One of those relocated said, “There is nothing to eat, drink and nothing to buy. Just nothing”6.
In response to the isolation and underdevelopment of Pyinmana, some workers have attempted to resist transfer. Even Than Shwe has decided to remain behind in Rangoon as the capital moves north7. However, this is only a possibility with high-level military connections. The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) has also issued a statement barring civil servants from resigning. Those caught abandoning their posts are to be charged under Emergency Provision Act - 5J for treason and insubordination8. Alternatively, some civil servants have been promised a six-fold increase in salary following their relocation9.
The absurdity of hurriedly moving the capital at such an expense to an isolated outpost where basic necessities cannot even be provided for government employees has led observers in the international and exiled media to provided elaborate hypotheses as to why this relocation was even contemplated. Most theories are connected with the military’s desire to retain absolute power in the face of an uncertain future. Following this line of thought are suggestions that the junta wishes greater security from a sea-born invasion (presumably by the United States); a more advantageous position vis-a-vis the various ethnic groups; to alienate the pro-democracy opposition by restricting them from the locus of political decision-making; and to isolate themselves from any popular uprising.
Arguments less tied to the junta’s authoritarian predilection have highlighted Pyinmana’s strategic location in relation to the proposed trans-Asian super highways which are intended to connect India, China and Thailand. Others have suggested that the dry zone of upper Burma is the cultural and historical heartland of the country. It is only natural, so the argument goes, that the capital should return here and provide a final cure to the country’s colonial hangover.
Intimately connected to the question of “Why move?” is “Why now?” Hypotheses about timing have been equally as varied. Much ink has been spent on discussions about the proclamations of astrologists close to Than Shwe. To support this view, observers have pointed to the SPDC’s requirement that the initial convoy depart at exactly 6:37 am on November 6th and that 11 ministries were opened in Pyinmana at 11:00 am on the 11th day of the 11th month. Alternatively, some observers have indicated that the move is meant to coincide with developments in the National Convention.
Another theory suggests that developments within the international community, more specifically within the United Nations Security Council, have potentially undermined the SPDC’s confidence in maintaining the status quo. The publication of Threat to Peace, commissioned by Nobel Laureates Desmond Tutu and Vaclav Havel and calling for Security Council action on Burma, and the December 16th 2005 Security Council briefing on Burma support such a theory. The timing of the Pyinmana move may therefore have been prompted by a new wariness of international action against the junta.
The causes and timing of the Pyinmana move can likely be attributed to a combination of these factors. Yet such explanations are to some extent superfluous to humanitarian and political concerns. It is rather the consequences of this move that deserve primary consideration. A more relevant approach would therefore seek to discern the impact of the capital relocation on the pro-democracy opposition and the position of the ethnic nationalities; the junta’s relationships with ASEAN; and the international community’s motivation to push for greater political liberalisation. These issues are more germane to the struggle for peace and democracy in Burma than postulates about the SPDC’s motivations.
The consequences of the Pyinmana move on Burma’s pro-democracy opposition will be negligible in the current context given that the National League for Democracy (NLD) and other political opposition groups have been more or less neutralised since the 2003 Depayin massacre. Regardless, the NLD may be restricted from opening a party office in the new capital and therefore be isolated from the new structures of government envisaged in the SPDC’s “Road Map”10. This view is seemingly confirmed by reports that Military Intelligence units transferred to Pyinmana summoned local NLD members from Pyinmana District on November 24th in order to interrogate them about current and planned activities. The NLD has denied the relocation will further constrain attempts at dialogue with the military. They also have no intention of moving their headquarters out of Rangoon. The junta has isolated political opposition and popular protest with some effectiveness at the National Convention. Citizens and some political parties have been obstructed from travelling to the remote site where the forum is being held. If the Convention is any indicator, the Pyinmana move may indeed become an obstacle to Burma’s pro-democracy movement. While opposition parties may be equally oppressed regardless of the capital’s location, a popular uprising would be more distinctly constrained through isolation.
Some analysts have argued that the move demonstrates the junta’s desire to increase control over areas of insurgency. Although, even if the relocation coincides with an increase in military offensives, there is little reason to suspect that the new capital will allow for a greater deployment of troops. Nor, for that matter, will it alleviate the challenges of accessing the rugged terrain where the remaining insurgencies are based. There is also no reason to conclude that incidents of human rights violations will necessarily increase or decrease as a consequence of the move. Due to the present isolation of the capital and restricted communication however, there may be an increase in regional military autonomy. This could lead to increasingly independent military policy across regions, at least until the central authority can effectively re-establish control from Pyinmana.
More remarkable are changes in attitude towards the SPDC from within ASEAN, given that the organisation has traditionally followed their stated policy of non-interference. During ASEAN’s 11th summit from December 12th to 13th 2005 Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines all expressed disappointment about Burma’s political situation11. To what extent the Pyinmana move contributed to these shifting sentiments is unclear, although statements by ASEAN leaders indicate that the move has further frustrated their relationship with the SPDC. Malaysian officials called the relocation “puzzling” and the country’s foreign minister, Syed Hamid, said Burma was both a burden and an embarrassment for ASEAN12. Thailand’s foreign minister similarly stated, “It came as a big surprise and that worried many Asean members”13. Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, normally a staunch supporter of the junta, admitted in December that he felt “uncomfortable” about the SPDC’s elusive behaviour14. Such concern prompted ASEAN to arrange for a delegation to visit Burma in early January to investigate the state of the country’s transition to democracy. Shortly before ASEAN officials were set to embark on their mission, Burmese officials said they were unable to accommodate the delegation at the present time, as relocating the capital was consuming all their time and energy. It would presumptuous to cite Pyinmana as the sole cause of ASEAN’s recent frustration with Burma and their shift to a more assertive policy, but it has most likely served to re-enforce concerns within the regional grouping about the junta’s unpredictability and volatility.
The larger international community will likely have less tolerance than ASEAN. Diplomats operating in Rangoon had no idea how to contact the SPDC when the junta departed the former capital. The SPDC also doesn’t seem concerned about relocating diplomatic missions any time soon. Burmese authorities said diplomats could arrange for the construction of embassies in Pyinmana in two years time. As such, diplomats in Rangoon were left severed from the junta. “If it’s urgent,” said one official in reference to foreign diplomats, “they can send a fax”15. This alienation has also been felt by international humanitarian agencies based in Rangoon. The UN likewise expressed its concern that the transfer of government ministries to Pyinmana would hinder their capacity to function effectively. The exasperation felt by diplomats, UN agencies, and aid organisations as a consequence of the Pyinmana move will surely contribute to the growing international consensus about the instability of Burma’s military regime and the need for a considered response. The December briefing on Burma’s humanitarian and political situation to the UN Security Council reinforces this perspective.
When taken as a whole, the consequences of the Pyinmana move highlight the extent to which the SPDC has disregarded regional and international opinion in favour of absurdly impulsive political and military initiatives. Although the site of the new capital may present obstacles to the pro-democracy movement and the ethnic nationalities, it will likely strengthen the international consensus about the incapacity of the present regime to function as a stable member of contemporary international society. The more the Burmese junta disregards the concerns of its neighbours and the wider international community, the greater the likelihood that it will be called to task within the UN Security Council.
Endnotes
1 “Burma’s rulers take the road to Mandalay”, The Independent, November 8, 2005.
2 “UN takes big step to address Myanmar (Burma) issues”, Thai Press Reports, December 7, 2005.
3 “Burma’s rulers take the road to Mandalay”, The Independent, November 8, 2005.
4 “Myanmar presses on with move to half-finished government compound”, Agence France Presse, November 7, 2005.
5 “Moving Target”, The Irrawaddy, November 9, 2005.
6 “SPDC’s leaders take to the hills”, Asia Times, November 23, 2005.
7 “The Faces of Burma 2005”, The Irrawaddy, December 2005.
8 “Burmese civil servants kept within barbed wires at new capital”, Democratic Voice of Burma, November 23, 2005.
9 “Some Burmese civil servants refuse to go to Pyinmana”, Democratic Voice of Burma, November 13, 2005.
10 “Loosing touch”, Mizzima News, November 4, 2005.
11 “Pay Back Time”, The Irrawaddy, December 13, 2005.
12 “Letter from Kuala Lumpur: Rangoon faces rare pressure from Asean”, The Nation, December 12, 2005.
13 “Onward and inward”, The Guardian, November 15, 2005; and “Junta’s move to new capital irks Asean”, The Bangkok Post, December 12, 2005.
14 “ASEAN Summit: Burma makes Thaksin ‘uncomfortable’”, The Nation, December 14, 2005.
15 “A capital move; Myanmar”, The Economist, November 11.
To go to the other articles published in the January 2006 BI Newsletter click on the links below:
There is nothing to eat, drink and nothing to buy. Just nothing
