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The Failure of State Building in Post War Burma

By M.McAteer

Since gaining independence after the Second World War, the ruling administrations of Burma have been unsuccessful in creating a state apparatus that fosters a common sense of nationhood among the citizens of the Union of Burma. There has never been a state framework which guarantees a sense of political equality for all ethnic groups or nationalities. Achieving this was always going to be an extremely difficult task. Burma’s ethnically diverse population has differing interpretations of their shared history which has installed a sense of separateness between the different ethnic nations. However, whatever their intentions, previous attempts at state and nation building by those in charge, have left the people who inhabit a land with a wealth of natural resources, poverty stricken and facing a desperate future.

Arguably it was colonization by the British, which began in 1824 and was completed in 1885, which shaped the political, economic and cultural development of the people of Burma. In “Ministerial Burma”, where the majority of the people were Burman, the British governed directly through a form of home rule. Infrastructure could be built at low cost and the land was productive particularly in the Irrawaddy basin. By 1920 Burma had become the world’s largest exporter of rice. In the “Frontier areas”, which constituted present day Shan, Kachin and Chin States as well as parts of the current Karen and Arakan States, authority remained with local traditional rulers under the loose supervision of colonial officers.

Different colonial experiences meant there were significantly different feelings toward the colonial masters in Burma. Anti-British tendencies grew strong among Burmese nationalists and it manifested itself in the deep hostility toward the mass migration of many Chinese and Indians who were brought in to operate businesses and run the country’s administration. In contrast the arrival of the British was welcomed by many of those in the mountainous areas. Christian missionaries, at this time, also promoted education and the transcription of ethnic languages which helped forge a sense of modern ethnic identity among a peoples who had previously been scattered or politically disparate1. New political and cultural organizations followed, in particular the Karen National Association in 1881. These new influences and institutions sat uneasily with Burmese nationalists and left a legacy of tensions that have been frequently voiced in the last one hundred years.2 The Second World War, after there had apparently been some improvement in ethnic relations in the 1930s, brought tensions once more to the forefront. Aung San and his compatriots of the Burma Independence Army (BIA) had first fought on the side of Imperial Japan while, minority peoples such as the Karen and Kachin aligned themselves with British. There were outbreaks of violence and the Karen, in particular, were targeted. In 1945, the BIA changed their allegiance and attempted to build bridges with the ethnic political leaders.

By 1947, there was hope that foundation stones for the building of modern Burma were in place with the signing of the Panglong Agreement by the Kachin, Shan and Rakhine. This agreement sought to promote the concept of “unity in diversity”. All national groups were envisioned as being equal. The right to autonomy and self determination was to underpin the future Union of Burma3. However, it must be noted at that not all ethnic groups were represented at the Panglong meeting, significantly Karen National Union (KNU), the successor to the Karen National Association, boycotted the meeting.

Despite this, the 1947 constitution attempted to create a sense and structure of national unity for the different groups of people who were previously ruled by individual administrations. However this formula for nation building did not reflect what was envisioned at Panglong, and it would prove insufficient in allowing for the development of a modern, sustainable, unified state.

The concept of power sharing between Ministerial Burma and the Ethnic Nationality States was put on the table, and there were to be two legislative chambers namely the Chamber of Deputies and the Chamber of Nationalities. However, there were marked inconsistencies in how territories were allocated to the different ethnic groups which invoked significant tensions. Only four groups Kachin, Karen, Karenni and Shan, were given independent states, and among these only the latter two were to be awarded the right of secession after ten years. The Chin on the other hand were only awarded what was known as “a special division” and others like Mon, Pao and Rakhine were not given any degree of independent control. Independence and parliamentary government arrived in 1948 but they were short lived and did not signal a new a sense of political parity between the different ethnic nationalities.

Instead what followed was protracted armed conflict, despite the fact that many ethnic political leaders, including Shan and Karen, were invited to take senior positions in the government. The assassination of Aung San, seen as the one person who could have prevented all out conflict between the central government forces and the armed ethnic groups, in July 1947 would prove to be a bitter blow.

The new central government faced escalating armed insurgency from various ethnic groups including the Karenni, Mon, Rakhine, Pao and the Karen, for whom the KNU took up arms to fight for an independent Karen State in January 1949. At this time they were also facing armed opposition from the Communist Party of Burma, who began their campaign in March 1948, just two months after independence had been declared. Throughout the 1950s, much of the countryside and the ethnic regions remained under the control of insurgent groups. The difficulties of the government were compounded by the entry of the Chinese nationalist Kuomintang troops, into Shan State, after the communist victory in their home country.

Against this backdrop, the military was developing itself as a powerful, and crucially, independent body. With the ensuing conflict came a massively consequential growth and reorganization of the army as they sought to neutralize factionalism and insurgencies against the state. In 1951 the Defense Services Institute was established, and this allowed the army to become a major commercial institution, with tax exemption status, outside civilian control. As well as this, in response to the Koumintang invasion in 1952, the army set about a major reconstruction of its internal apparatus. Under Lieutenant Colonel Maung Maung the War office was transformed and the Defense Services Academy for officer training was established. By 1962 the army had increased to some 100,000 troops from 5,000 in 1948

The Army got its first taste of control, as a caretaker government in 1958, before returning power to Prime Minister U Nu in 1960 following elections. U Nu had been the Burmese Prime Minister since parliamentary democracy began in 1948. This election was unable to secure a parliamentary government that would stabilize the country. Insurgencies grew in Shan State and also in Kachin State, where Christians objected increased strongly to U Nu’s move to make Buddhism the State religion. At this time ethnic politicians, established a Federal Movement in 1960, under Sao Shwe Thaike, in an attempt to make the union more equitable. They set out plans to create explicit federalism, rather than the token efforts previously seen, which guaranteed equal rights and opportunities for all. They sought initiatives that would prevent the monopolization of power and government by those in Rangoon. However both U Nu and Ne Win, who had led the Tatmadaw since 1949, were distinctly unenthusiastic about ethnic rights of autonomy or secession, including those laid out in the 1947 constitution.

In 1962, as U Nu was preparing to meet Federalist leaders, Ne Win seized power in a military coup, claiming Federalism to be “impossible”. The military began its own process of “nation building” which amounted to creating a one party state which set out to control every sector of society. Sustained attempts to stamp out all political opposition and dissent followed as well the complete nationalization of all major industries. The government followed a bizarre “ideology”, the “Burmese Way to Socialism”, a mixture of socialist, nationalist and Buddhist principles. The economy fell into freefall and ethnic insurgencies escalated. Through the actions of the military government relations between the state and society became increasingly dysfunctional. The state became politically insulated and isolated and as a result totally unresponsive to the needs of the Burmese people.

This was felt particularly in the ethnic segments of society. Independent and religious schools were closed and the use minority languages in education and in publications virtually disappeared. Ethnic minority peoples were also excluded from senior levels in the Tatmadaw and the government. As well as this a brutal counter insurgency campaign followed. The “four cuts policy” which attempted to cut off support for rebels by brutally attacking civilians and forcing them to move to government controlled areas from insurgent controlled and disputed areas, began in earnest in the early1970s.

By the 1980s, two main opposition blocks emerged, one under the Communist Party of Burma and the other under the National Democratic Front, who sought a federal Union of Burma. The ethnic borderlands remained out of the government’s control and the authority of the central state remained highly contested. Under Ne Win’s leadership the Burma Socialist Program Party’s (BSPP) military government failed in their self appointed role as “Nation Builders”. Political institutions withered, infrastructure decayed and the state had no answer to the country’s ever declining economic problems and the impoverishment of the people.

Amid a wave of student protests, Ne Win resigned and the BSPP government collapsed in July 1988. The State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) took control of the country’s administration and declared a state of emergency and martial law. They also announced that free and democratic general elections would be held in 1990. The National League for Democracy, under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi, secured 82 per cent of the vote in the election however SLORC refused to honour the result. SLORC (since 1997 known as the State Peace and Development Council, or SPDC) as well as being completely illegitimate, has also demonstrated that it is incapable of creating a state which serves the people who live within its borders.

Today the extent of central authority over matters within the country remains unclear. Indeed, in certain parts of the country the central state has no clear demarcations of authority. After 1990 there has been distinct rise in the authority and power of the regional commanders in the army. After dismantling the old socialist state and party, at the request of SLORC, the new and transformed administrative and economic arrangements put in place, created a state structure which has often allowed regional heads to ignore ministerial directives from the central government4. The economic and political clout of regional commanders has at no point since independence been as significant as it has become under the SLORC/SPDC regime5. This has led to what has been described as “warlord-ism”, a situation where the structure of the state allows for connected individuals within the military to use their position for significant financial gain.

The military junta, in its various guises since 1962, under the pretext of upholding stability and national unity has simply sought to either neutralize or destroy its enemies6. Despite the charade of the national convention, which was suspended in early 2006, a part of the supposed “roadmap to democracy”, the military has shown no credible desire for national reconciliation. The state in Burma remains a tool which allows the upper echelons of the Tatmadaw and their families to live a privileged existence. The military have retained a tight grip on the Union of Myanmar Economic holdings and the Myanmar Economic Corporation companies, which “operate as a slush fund on behalf of the military leadership”, bringing them substantial wealth whilst the rest of the country faces grinding poverty. Whilst stating “stability” and “nation building” as prime concerns, the policies of the SPDC in reality, have not established a consensual identity and have contrived a state where the rights of a small elite subjugate those of the vast majority of people in the country. Armed conflict, militarization and large scale repression of ethnic peoples’ rights are still widespread, as the recent forced displacement of more than 16,000 Karen civilians in the largest offensive by the Burmese army in ten years illustrates.

Burma’s post independence history has shown that imposing solutions from one group or groups on others is incompatible with developing a sense of nationhood or a state that guarantees and gives protection to the rights to all those who live within its territorial boundaries. Any future attempts need to be completely inclusive and must be based on visions regarding a shared future rather than on what each groups’ interpretation of history tells them they are owed. Nearly all political, economic and social activities are controlled by the military and therefore significant major structural changes are required. All ethnic groups in Burma must be incorporated in the decision making process about how the future Burma should look.

Endnotes

  1. Burma (Myanmar): The Time for Change, Minority Rights Group International Report, 2002
  2. Burma and National Reconciliation: Ethnic Conflict and State Society Dysfunction, C Yawnghwe, 2001
  3. Burma and National Reconciliation: Ethnic Conflict and State Society Dysfunction, C Yawnghwe, 2001
  4. Beyond Politics: Societal Imperatives in Burma, State Building, Marin B Pedersen, 2005
  5. Junta Dreams or Nightmares? Observations of Burma’s Military Since 1988, Callahan, 1999
  6. Making Enemies and State Building, Callahan, 2005

To go to the other articles published in the April 2006 BI Newsletter click on the links below:

Constitutional Frameworks: Who’s Drafting Burma’s Future?
People's Stories: Life at the Military's Gunpoint