On January 31 1949 the Karen people
launched an attack against the Burmese
government, seizing Insein a small town just outside Rangoon. This followed numerous events over the past weeks where Karen communities within Insein were fired upon by Burmese authorities and members of the Insein community. Communication between the government and the Karen had been cut, so a diplomatic solution could not be reached. The Karen, by seizing Insein, sparked a civil war which is ongoing today.
While the ideological reasons behind the armed conflict between the Karen and the central Burmese authorities (be they military dictatorship or elected government) remain strong, the disunity among the Karen is perhaps their biggest threat. Throughout the 58 years of civil war the Karen are still standing in armed opposition to the Burmese authorities, and recently their major defeats are not from the Burmese military, but rather from splits within the Karen National Union (KNU).
This disunity, which has plagued the KNU and its armed wing the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) for decades, and has increased in the past 12 years, and was further, demonstrated in January this year with another split. The commander of the KNLA 7th Brigade Major-General Htain Maung was dismissed from the KNLA, after 58 years of involvement in the Karen insurgency, following making numerous attempts to broker a ceasefire agreement with the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC - the Burmese junta). These attempts spanned a number of months were not sanctioned by the KNU’s Central Committee.
Following his dismissal, Htain Maung and a small group of supporters, estimated to be about 30 soldiers and their friends and family, formed a splinter group called the Karen National Union - Karen National Liberation Army Peace Council (KNU/KNLA PC). The group which is based at Toh Kaw Koe village, Pa-An District, Karen State, has surrendered to the SPDC, but still retain their arms.
Interesting Fact:
Toe Kaw Koe village, where Htain Maung has established the base of the KNU/KNLA PC has significant meaning for the Karen. In 1950, the President of the KNU Saw Ba Oo Gyi and some other Karen leaders were killed near Toe Kaw Koe village. On August 12, 1950, the Burmese surrounded the group while they were sleeping and demanded they surrender. When the group did not fighting broke out and all the Karen were killed, with the exception of Saw Ba Oo Gyi. He was captured, tortured and killed later that day. Every August 12th the Karen community celebrates Martyr’s Day, and where the group was ambushed is known as Martyr’s Place. It is a very important site to the Karen.
However Htain Maung is not acting alone. There are reports that Htain Maung is listening to the advice of Colonel Ner Dah Mya, the son of Bo Mya who died last year, and Pastor Timothy, a former member of the KNU foreign affairs committee. Both Pastor Timothy and Ner Dah Mya were involved in several meetings with delegates from the State Peace and Development Council aimed at brokering a ceasefire agreement between the junta and the KNU. When the KNU rejected these discussions, it caused tensions.
It also came at a time when the leadership of the KNU was not very strong. Following the death of Bo Mya in December 2006 the leadership of the KNU has been in a state of transition, but without a clear leader in sight. This state of “not knowing” has in itself caused a lot of tension within the KNU leadership, the Karen population and between the leadership and the people. This tension has been further exacerbated by the 7th Brigade split.
However this split is different from previous ones between different factions of the Karen leadership. What makes it different is that the splinter group has not become the enemy of the KNU and the KNLA, but as just surrendered to the SPDC. Following previous splits, the splinter group attacked the KNLA and led to significant military defeats.
One such example is the split in the mid-1990s when a group of more than 1,000 Karen soldiers under the leadership of U Thuzana, a Buddhist monk, and Tha Htoo Kyaw formed a new group called the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA). The reason for the split was ongoing conflict between Christian and Buddhist members of the KNU. Following the split the DKBA entered into a ceasefire with the junta and shortly after Manerplaw, the KNU headquarters, fell to the Burmese military (with the help of the DKBA).
The fall of the Manerplaw resulted in a mass exodus of refugees to Thailand and it significantly affected the KNU’s ability to withstand the Burmese army. Since then the KNLA and DKBA have been fighting each other, with reports of recent clashes earlier this month.
Despite differences between this new split and previous ones, the fact remains that throughout the past 12 years internal tensions and conflicts have increased, leading to four significant splits and resulting in the surrender of some splinter-groups to the junta.
However, one must question the motives of the SPDC. While from an outsider’s perspective developing a ceasefire looks like a step towards peace, the manner which the SPDC is going about brokering these ceasefires agreement is questionable, especially if the objective is real peace.
Throughout history the Burmese junta, in all its shapes and sizes, has divided and conquered the different ethnic groups. By separating and isolating each population and different factions within one group, they have managed to break down each group’s resistance and in turn they have submitted to the Burmese military. This has proven to be a very effective strategy and has a long history in Burma - it was used by the British when they colonized the country.
A tactic that has emerged over the past decade is that the junta has started approaching individuals, such as battalion leaders and local commanders, rather than going through the official KNU channels to discuss possible ceasefires, often going through religious leaders. By isolating the local authorities and negotiating only with them in relation to developing a ceasefire for a small portion of Karen State, it puts the local leaders and the KNU as a whole in a weaker bargaining position and lead to an unfavourable agreement. This is further compounded, because the individuals the SPDC target are generally career soldiers rather than politicians, exploiting their lack of political or negotiating experience.
Furthermore external pressures from businesses and other countries play a significant factor in ceasefire agreements. Thailand, where a significant portion of Burma’s refugee population is receiving shelter, puts pressure on armed groups to make ceasefire agreements with the Burmese junta. Thailand and Thai businesses’ have a lot of investments in Burma, and should the border area stabilize, they would be able to expand their business ventures in the area.
In Pa-An, where the KNU/KNLA PC is located, there are a lot of opportunities for economic development. Prior to a development project beginning there needs to be a certain level of stability around the site. Consequently the Burmese military needs to have complete control over the area or have a ceasefire with a group that does. Thus, as a ceasefire has been reached for a part of Pa-An district, one can expect to see a dramatic increase in development projects in the area with some investment coming from Thailand.
However, the split and proposed development of the area will lead to further human rights abuses in the area. As the area becomes more militarized, which follows ceasefires and the opening up of areas for development, there is a rise in incidents of human rights abuses. There are already reports of increased land confiscation, arbitrary taxation and forced labour demands from villagers in the ceasefire area. The three human rights abuses mentioned above are occurring in the ceasefire area in 7th Brigade undermine people’s ability to survive. As most Karen people rely heavily on the land for their livelihoods, having their land confiscated without compensation directly impacts their ability to provide for themselves and their families. Forced labour restricts the time people can spend working in their fields, again negatively affecting their livelihoods. For villagers, being exploited financially further compounds the situation they are in. As their financial resources are being constantly depleted, their escape from poverty becomes less and less likely.
Furthermore even with a ceasefire, it does not necessary mean the end to conflict or conflict-related impacts. In eastern Burma 287,000 people are internally displaced in ceasefire areas. These internally displaced people (IDPs) account for more than half of the total number of IDPs in eastern Burma.1 And while this figure has decreased from 2005 by approximately 50,000 people, the sheer number of IDPs in ceasefire areas remains alarming.
Also significant is the impact the split has had on the Karen people morale and spirit. This is more difficult to determine, as it is not easy to measure. Despite that, the impact is very real. Htain Maung had been with the Karen resistance since 1949 and the commander of 7th Brigade since 1970. He was seen as a leader and a protector for the Karen people and what they are struggling for. His defection was a blow to that confidence and the trust that the people had put into him. Throughout the years, people continued to struggle and resist the Burmese military in all forms, whether it was through military service in the KNLA, or fleeing their villages rather than submitting to forced relocation orders. In order to carry out this resistance people died, families suffered, and no one was left unscarred, whether they were affected physically, emotionally or mentally. While this is due to their unwavering belief in a better future, it can also be partially attributed to their support for their leader, in this case Htain Maung. His defection was seen as a betrayal at the deepest level.
The split also has militaristic and strategic benefit for the SPDC. Pa-An district is in the centre of Karen State. The area where the KNU-KNLA PC is located is in the centre of this district. By establishing a military presence there, whether with soldiers from the Burmese army or a proxy force, it has enabled the SPDC to begin getting a stronghold over the area. By controlling this area, regardless of how small it may be, the Burmese military can encroach on other parts of the district, effectively cutting northern Karen State from the south. This further isolates communities and local Karen authorities, making them more vulnerable, and easier to force into submission.
At an international level it sends a clear picture of disunity. Within one ethnic group there is so much disunity and in-fighting, and one has to question how this ethnic group would function if the military junta was ousted tomorrow? And this is a big picture question, because it is not only about the Karen, it applies to many different groups within their own ethnic societies, between different ethnic groups, and between the democracy movement and the ethnic groups. Without a doubt this disunity is sending an extremely negative image, and is reiterating the SPDC’s point that they are the only mechanism that can keep the country united.
Today the greatest threat to the Karen resistance is not the Burmese, but the lack of unity. All Karen groups ideologically are fighting for the same thing, however, there is so much disunity – there are Karen killing Karen. After 58 years the Karen are still standing against the Burmese authorities, however, their stance has weakened significantly. Effectively the SPDC does not need to do anything, but rather wait and watch these groups unravel themselves. Emphasis needs to be put on uniting the people, and making sure that the leadership is a representation of the people. Without it, it is only a matter of time until there is another split, and then another, and another, until there is nothing more and the silence of oppression is deafening.
Endnotes:
“Internal Displacement in Eastern Burma 2006 Survey”, Thailand Burma Border Consortium, November 2006
To go to the other articles published in the February 2007 BI Newsletter click on the links below:
