To the outsider, the view of Karen State
as a chaotic, repressed community prob
ably leads to the perception that grassroots administration and organisation is dead in the water. One might assume that violence and desperation have torn apart the structures of traditional leadership. However, a closer look at the situation shows that this is far from the truth. The good news is that leadership structures remain in place and there are efforts to enhance this leadership with a solid dose of people power.
Continuing the administration at grassroots level goes hand in hand with ongoing efforts to organise villages into strong, self-determining communities. This way, they are better equipped to rise above the State Peace and Development Council’s (SPDC), relentless pursuit of absolute submission. Efforts by the international community to bring about change in Burma’s regime are futile without first succeeding to create a healthy movement of free-thinking, politically motivated people at a grassroots level.
Imagine if a positive change did happen at the top end of the Burmese administration; Great stuff, but how could a new political system thrive without the enthusiastic participation of an organised population?
This is where the village comes into play. In his report, Mapping and Empowerment, researcher Noah Vines emphasises the potential of villages to foster political change; “Not only are villages the site of everyday activity, but they are also traditional centers of authority where power relations are observable.”
Village life has stood the test of time in Burma. With this in mind, it seems to be a question of how best to capitalise on the potential of village leadership.
So, how are villages administrated?
Within Karen State the administrative situation depends entirely on which of three “zones” a village is in. The three zones are defined by villagers, opposition groups and the SPDC as;
The black zone – controlled by armed opposition groups, in Karen State this means the Karen National Union (KNU)
The brown zone – neither the KNU nor the SPDC has been able to take full control from the other, and both are active in these areas
The white zone – controlled by the SPDC
Villages, typically containing ten to thirty households, usually have an administration of about seven people, including the head villager, a treasurer, a secretary and a head of security.
In the brown zone, where both the KNU and the SPDC are active, things get complicated. These villages are torn between two conflicting authorities and there are two separate administrations; one answering to the SPDC and the other to the KNU. In this situation one village has two separate head villagers, one for the SPDC and one for the KNU.
For each administration, villagers hold a meeting to decide who will be the head villager. However, it is rarely a question of voting - the villagers discuss the matter and come to a decision together. The role of head villager is not an easy one, and most villagers do not want the position. However, they have little choice. Once the villagers make a decision, the nominee is expected to accept. The head villager takes the role for one year, after which the village may decide he should continue for a second year.
The head villager aligned with the SPDC has the unenviable task of reporting to the SPDC every day. He must give them information about any contact the village has had with the Karen National Liberation Army, the armed wing of the KNU. This puts him in a tough situation; doing this might alienate him from his community, but lying to the SPDC (and getting caught) will result in torture. On top of this, the SPDC’s head villager is expected to select villagers for the SPDC’s notorious “forced labour” program. The SPDC head villager is also responsible for collecting taxes and other duties.
The KNU head villager also has to liaise with the KNU, but not every day. He is responsible for the collection of KNU taxes (villagers in the brown zone pay taxes to a number of different authorities). For the most part, the SPDC doesn’t know about the KNU head villager but if they do find out, the KNU head villager has no choice but to flee for his safety.
Add to this the fact that both head villagers have to sacrifice time from their work (mainly agriculture), which directly affects their livelihoods and impacts on their ability to feed their family, and you can understand why many are reluctant to take either post.
It is confusing how two separate administrations manage one small village. While the two village heads do not work together, they do sometimes share ideas.
In the black zone, controlled by the KNU, things are simpler since there is only one administration system (aligned with the KNU) also decided by a village meeting. Head villagers and their administration systems are responsible for general administrative tasks, including tax collection and liaising with the KNU. Head villagers in the black zone are also expected to select villagers to assist with “labour” for the KNU and KNLA, for example transporting supplies for the KNLA military activities or relief work. Although this is not referred to as “forced labour”, villagers are understandably reluctant to leave their work and livelihood to assist with unpaid KNU labour. This can lead to frustrations between the administration systems and villagers and further underlines the difficulty faced by head villagers.
A village’s administration can also make rulings about minor disputes within the village.
In the SPDC-controlled white zone, villages only have an SPDC administration.
Since November 1997 the Burmese junta has carried out intensive military offensives targeting civilians in Karen State pretty much on an annual basis. Consequently, village administrations have been put to the test. Villages have become more isolated due to the conflict surrounding them. Administrative structures are under increasing pressure to hold together and leadership has become an even tougher role to perform. However, the fact that village administrations are able to hold up under such circumstances demonstrates the strength and potential of grassroots organisation.
It is this potential that many community-based organisations (CBOs) working cross-border into Karen State on good governance projects and local programs to develop and strength administration systems hope to tap into. One objective of these projects is to communicate with villagers and develop a culture of critical thinking and strategic planning. CBO workers says that one of the major hurdles to encouraging change in Burma, particularly in Karen State, is that grassroots people have been largely battered into submission by an unrelenting regime (the SPDC). After decades of oppression and being forced not to express dissent, many villagers have lost the willingness not only to express their views, but even to think about them.
Burma remains so heavily repressed internally...that promoting change through legal channels or building organizational capacities within the country are virtually futile, unless they begin from the most basic foundations: the grassroots majority
This mindset is often referred to as “the culture of oppression”. Reversing the culture of oppression, at the village level, is one of the biggest factors in bringing about change in Burma. While most of the international community is concerned with pressuring the top end of Burmese society, very few are concerned with mobilising village ideology.
Most people seem to think, “the military government are the bad guys, so let’s start by fixing them.”
In his report, Noah Vines laments the international community’s focus on Burma as a problem to be solved from the “top-down”. He concludes that solving Burma’s problems has more to do with a “bottom-up” approach.
“Burma remains so heavily repressed internally…that promoting change through legal channels or building organizational capabilities within the country are virtually futile, unless they begin from the most basic foundations: the grassroots majority.”
In other words, start by mobilising the grassroots of a society (while still keeping pressure on the ruling regime). If you enhance a desire for empowerment at village level, you plant a seed that slowly grows into social and political change at the top. Community based organisations (CBOs) run training programs inside Burma, aiming to help communities “develop the broader skills, courage, wisdom and confidence necessary to participate fully and effectively in their broader community and the broader society.”
However, the culture of oppression is caused by many factors, not only the SPDC. People are also reluctant to voice their opinions with the KNU.
Furthermore, Karen culture itself is in many ways inclined towards the culture of oppression, since Karen people are not used to questioning authority. Most villagers only think in terms of their livelihood. They don’t think in terms of organisation or politics. This can be traced back to the education system, where children have been taught by repeating after the teacher and simply accepting information. Children’s education in the villages has to be radically changed, students have to be encouraged to think critically and analyse information, not merely regurgitate answers.
Even the style of village meetings needs to be changed. For example, seating at meetings is usually set up according to each villager’s importance; people of higher importance sit higher than the other villagers. This might seem natural, but this causes an atmosphere of domination and can prevent some villagers from having the confidence to express their ideas, or question what they are told.
Similarly, when outsiders visit the villages, villagers often assume that the outsider is smarter, more worldly and more capable then themselves. So, they simply accept what the outsider tells them, rather then thinking critically.
When I asked one CBO worker if he feels optimistic that this culture is changing, he says that even though process is slow, it is changing.
“It takes a generation,” he says “and it must start in the schools.”
The trick, he says, is not to get involved in preaching politics, rather, it is to encourage grassroots people to solve problems and form their own analysis. By achieving this, the people’s ability to participate in long existing village administration structures will be enhanced. This, in turn, brings benefits not only to the village itself, but also on a bigger scale. Perhaps the traditional village system will one day provide the catalyst for the empowerment of Burma as a nation.
To go to the other articles published in the September 2007 BI Newsletter click on the links below:
Burma remains so heavily repressed internally...that promoting change through legal channels or building organizational capacities within the country are virtually futile, unless they begin from the most basic foundations: the grassroots majority
