Living Ghosts
The spiraling repression of the Karenni population by the Burmese military junta
Chapter 2: Oppression
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Chapter Overview
The people of Karenni
State are oppressed by the Burmese army, ceasefire groups
and the KNPP. The state is becoming increasingly militarised;
human rights are frequently violated; villagers have to
report to Burmese military camps on a daily basis, which
can be 12 hours walk (round trip) away. Villagers live
in constant fear of spies for the Burmese army within
their communities and of being punished in retaliation
for KNPP acts by the Burmese army. Whilst all of these
tactics have resulted in villagers living in extreme isolation,
however, they are not defeat and in fact, implement a
number of different strategies, staging their own non-violent
resistance movement.
In this chapter:
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In Karenni State the people are oppressed and their lives are consumed by fear. The Burmese junta employs a strategy of total control under the guise of counter-insurgency. For decades the main target of the junta’s military campaigns has been the civilian population.
2.1 SPDC Tactics
2.1.1 Human Rights Abuses
The Burmese army continues to oppress the ethnic people of Karenni State and all of Burma through indirect tactics. While extra-judicial killings still take place, the army concentrates its efforts on destroying villagers’ capacity and ability to survive. The military destroys food sources, forces people to undertake labour intensive projects, demolishes houses, forcibly relocates entire villages, confiscates land without compensation and arbitrarily extorts money and commodities from communities. While not directly killing people, these tactics slowly and systematically erode their livelihoods, spirits and eventually their ability to survive.
Theft and/or destruction of Property and Food
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On December 25th, 2003, fighting broke out between the SPDC LIB 250, 261 and 242 and KNPP troops near Tenuso Mountain. During the fighting, the SPDC troops destroyed 1,600 tins of rice (24,000 kilograms) from Dxxx Tx Ax village. This was enough rice to feed 133 adults for an entire year.
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Burmese soldiers extort food and possessions, including clothing from villagers. Lists of demanded items are presented to village headmen who are required to collect the goods from villagers and deliver them to the soldiers. Failure to do so results in fines, punishment and/or future harassment.
In addition to the theft of food and belongings, the SPDC destroys food stores, crops and villagers’ possessions. Cooking pots and plates are bayoneted and the resulting holes making them useless. Entire villages are burned down and stores with the whole communities’ crops for the year are destroyed.
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On December 21st, 2002, messengers from D—P- S— and B- Ku villages told their communities that Warrant Officer Aung Shwe from the H— L—base had demanded that the villages provide 1.6 kilograms and 3.2 kilograms of chicken respectively.
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Villagers are not compensated for this loss. Statistics show that villagers whose food supplies have been compromised are 4.6 times more likely to be injured by a landmine than those whose food supplies are secure, because they are looking for food in the jungle where there is landmine contamination.16 Furthermore, as a result of the villagers’ isolation, travel restrictions and poverty, it is not possible for them to replace their belongings. Villagers are expected to silently manage somehow.
Restriction on Movement
“Whenever the Burmese
army heard that KNPP soldiers were nearby, they tell us not
to go to our fields. But if we listen to them and do not go
to our farms, what will we eat?” – K- R— said.
Villagers’ paddy fields are far away from their homes, however, the Burmese army and ceasefire groups restrict villagers’ movements. The villagers have to buy a day pass, which are only valid for one day, from dawn to dusk, to travel outside their village. This does not give people enough time to travel to their fields, work, search for food and return. If the villagers do not return or are late they are accused of contacting the KNPP and are often punished. The restriction of villagers’ movements effects their crops, the yield and how much food they have for their families.
“The SPDC prohibits
us from staying at our fields for more than one week and we
are not allowed to light fires. If there is fighting near
our farms, we are too scared to go to our fields. If you go
and the Burmese soldiers find you, they will accuse you of
helping the KNPP and punish you. Some people have been beaten,”
– T--- R-- said.
The SPDC also arbitrarily closes roads for non-military travel in Karenni State, further restricting villagers movements. Landmines are often planted along roads to prohibit the villagers’ movements. Villagers, fearful of landmines and potential injuries, further restrict their own movements.
Even with a valid travel pass villagers are still vulnerable to abuses and exploitation. There have been reports of arrests, torture, extra-judicial killings and rapes of villagers who have had permission to travel. Villagers have also been shot at when they have been outside of their communities.
Arbitrary taxation and fines
Only 40 per cent of the SPDC’s annual budget is covered through ordinary taxes.17 Printing more money, foreign investment, arbitrary taxation and fines covers the 60 per cent deficit. While taxation is necessary in every country, in Burma taxation amounts to systematic extortion undertaken with impunity.
Villagers cite arbitrary taxation and levies as the largest threat to their
livelihoods. In Karenni State people face taxation from the
SPDC, ceasefire groups and the KNPP. This multi-lateral taxation
creates further hardships for villagers who are already facing
difficulties making ends meet. In some instances villagers
are not informed what the tax is for or how their money will
be used – they simply pay the tax.
“When an armed group
came to the village they would demand money. When the villagers
tried to explain that they had already paid taxes to another
group, they would get angry and say “If you can pay them,
you can pay us”” – T-- R-- said.
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Community Forests
Many villagers depend on the forest surrounding their communities as a source of income. Villagers will search through local forests looking for plants, herbs and roots that they can sell at the markets. The sale of these items supplements their income, and enables villagers to buy essential commodities such as rice.
The SPDC and ceasefire groups have prohibited villagers from visiting the forests. Villagers now need to purchase a pass from the local authorities giving them permission to travel into and through the forests. This is a form of arbitrary taxation.
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Additionally, fines are linked to other restrictions imposed on the villagers, such as the restriction of movement. For example, if a villager is caught traveling without a valid pass they are fined.
In order to avoid punishment and further human rights abuses villagers put taxation demands before their own needs. Families cannot afford to adequately feed their children, educate them or access health services because they simply do not have the financial resources. For villagers being financially exploited further compounds the situation they are in. As their financial resources are constantly being depleted, their escape from poverty becomes less and less likely.
Forced Labour
Burma became a signatory to the Convention Against Forced Labour in 1955. Despite this the practice of conscripting people to work without compensation is common through out the country and in Karenni State. Villagers cite forced labour as one of the most common human rights abuses in Karenni State. The International Labour Organization (ILO) stated in a 2007 report that the SPDC’s systematic use of forced labour is widespread throughout the nation. Ceasefire groups and the KNPP also use forced labour.
Villagers are obliged to perform a variety of tasks, some lasting a few hours, while others, such as portering, can take weeks. Failure to serve the demands of the army results in punishment. The most common tasks imposed on villagers, regardless of age, gender or infirmity, include:
- Construction or repairs of military camps and facilities
- Portering (carrying military equipment, rations, supplies, etc during military activities)
- Other support activities for the military camps (sending messages, acting as guides, cooking, etc)
- Income generation for the military (working on military plantations)
- Building or maintaining national or local infrastructure projects
- Militia duty
- Sentry duty
Instances of Forced Labour:
Example 1:
“In January this year (2003) one member from every family in the nine villages in Hxxx Pxx Kx Lx village tract and the five in the Dxx Kx Lxxx Dx village tract had to go and work for the military every day during the dry season. The villagers had to take their own food and equipment, such as hoes and pickaxes. They were building a fence for the SPDC. Anyone who did not send someone had to pay a 500 Kyat fine per day.”
Example 2:
Burmese troops from LIB 250 and 261 ordered villagers at the Nxxx Lx Bxx relocation site to send a messenger to their military base once a week. If they failed to send someone the villagers were fined 400 Kyat. If the messenger failed to turn up three times they were imprisoned for four days.
Example 3:
Burmese troops from LIB 427 ordered four villagers from Rx Pxx Kx section of Dxxx Mxx Hxx to guard the towns check point every day. If the villagers failed to send a guard or if the guards fell asleep on duty they would fine the villagers 3 chickens each time.
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Forced labour directly contributes to food scarcity, loss of income, loss of opportunity to go to school and consequently poverty. When villagers are forced to work for the SPDC for extended periods of time, without compensation, they neglect their own livelihoods.
While being forced to work villagers are also subjected to additional human rights abuses, such as beatings, destruction of property, rape and even extra-judicial killings.
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Prison Porters
In 2007 the Burmese troops under Light Infantry Battalion 55 (LIB 55) took prisoners to use as porters in eastern Karenni State. Most of the porters were prisoners from well-known prisons: Mandalay, Insein, Myin Chan and Lashio. It is believed that by taking prisoners from areas far away from where the offensive is taking place, the porters will be less likely to attempt to escape, because they do not know the language or the area. The prisoners that are used as porters include murderers, bandits, drug users and others, anyone who cannot bribe their way out.
A group of five prison porters assigned to the LIB 55 serving in the frontline fled the military camp that they were assigned to and escaped to the Thai-Burma border. One porter, who deserted the Burmese army base in February 2007, said that he was a prisoner from Mandalay Prison and taken from the prison to be a porter in January. He said that there are a total of 250 prisoners taken from Mandalay Prison. Some of the 250 were sent to the battalions under Burmese army LIB 55 and others were sent to troops in other parts of Burma.
The porter said that when the prison official calls for porters, the prisoners who could pay a bribe to the officials were excused from being a porter. “I couldn’t pay the money, so they removed me and sent me to be porter in the frontline” he said.
After he and other prisoners were taken from the Mandalay Prison, they were moved to a prison in Loikaw and then to Shadaw, both in Karenni State. After they crossed the Salween River, they arrived at a Burmese army camp. Ill prisoners were left in the camp, while the others moved to another army camp which was near the KNPP’s base Nyarmu.
During the trip the prison porters had to carry heavy loads consisting of food supplies, ammunition, shells and equipment for the army over steep and mountainous terrain along jungle tracks. The porters were forced to carry soldiers who had been injured from landmines and battle. Upon arriving at their destination, the porters are not given any respite. They are immediately put straight to work digging trenches or bunkers, building fences and carrying water from faraway sources.
Another prisoner who was taken from Mandalay prison, who was serving a seven-year sentence for murder, said that “the porters were made to walk all day and night and the things that we carry are unfairly heavy. The way is very mountainous and rocky, and some of us don’t have shoes. If we stop walking, the troops kick us and hit us with their gun. One of my porter friends was shot dead by a troop because he was so weak and couldn’t walk after a long trip.”
Many porters risk their lives to escape from the ruthless condition under the military troops where they can be worked to death. One of the five prison porters mentioned above said “we porters were beaten often, hit and punished by the commanding officers through we did nothing wrong. I saw one of my porter friends was shot, dead, in front of me. Many porters are waiting for the chance to escape but if the troops discover them, the porters will be shot”.
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Land Confiscation
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In 2007 over 3,000 acres of farmland was confiscated by the SPDC in northern Loikaw. This area is being converted into an industrial zone.18
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People from Karenni State have a special connection with their land that goes beyond ownership. While people have the opportunity to resettle or seek asylum in Thailand they do not want to move away from their land. It is a part of their identity.
The Burmese army confiscates land from villagers with either inadequate or no compensation. The 1953 Lands Nationalisation and Agricultural Lands Act, the 1963 Tenancy Act and the 1963 Protection of the Right to Cultivation Act effectively striped all farmers of the right to own land. Notification Number 4/78 further restricts people’s rights to own land. Under the notification land can be confiscated if farmers fail to cultivate the land with a specific crop and produce a set yield, or if they failed to sell a set quota to the junta at a predetermined price. Farmers have no avenues for redress under these laws.
In addition to confiscating the land, the crops that are being grown on the land also become property of the SPDC. Villagers do not only lose their source of livelihood but also their harvest, making them vulnerable to food shortages. The majority of people in Karenni State are dependent on agriculture for their livelihoods and there is a direct link between land confiscation and loss of livelihood.
The SPDC confiscates land for three purposes: to control the local population, for development projects and to support the militarisation of areas (usually the land is used to grow food for the soldiers).
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Self Reliance Programme
The Self Reliance Programme introduced in 1988 aimed to compensate for deficits in the national budget. Villages and townships became responsible for funding public services in their communities, such as schools. Under this programme, in the 1990s soldiers stopped receiving full rations and salaries and were encouraged to be more self-sufficient. This led to increased: land confiscation, extortion of money and property, and forced labour demands.
While the soldiers in the frontline did abuse the villagers’ human rights, and continue to do so, they too are victims. The policies implemented by the upper echelons of the military created a system where the soldiers’ were encouraged to use their resources in order for their basic needs to be met.
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Extra-judicial killings
N--- M-‘s Experiences
N--- M-’s husband was killed about four years (2003) ago by troops from the KNPLF, a group affiliated with the State Peace and Development Council SPDC.
“When he came back
from the field, someone sent from the KNPLF came to tell him
to go with him. After that, I never saw him alive again. The
next morning, other villagers told me that they had heard
a gunshot coming from the area where my husband was detained.
As soon as I heard that I told my eldest daughter and together
we went there to see what has happened. When we arrived there
I saw him lying on the ground. His head was covered with blood.
He was dead,” she said.
Sadly, N--- M-’s father-in-law, who was 80 years old, was shot dead by a Burmese soldier in June 2006.
“On that night, he
was walking home after visiting his grandchildren when he
accidentally ran into a drunk Burmese soldier. Without any
search or question, the soldier took out his gun and shot
him without any mercy,” N-- M- said.
Even though the soldier had murdered a villager, the military took no action against the culprit claiming that it was an accidental shooting.
Arbitrary Detention
B--- R----- S----’s Experience
“The Burmese soldiers
detained me when I was about eight months pregnant, together
with my two sons who are twelve and three years old after
they couldn’t find my husband,” B— R—— S— said.
The Burmese troops wanted to arrest B--- R----- S----’s husband after a clash between SPDC troops and Karenni National People’s Party soldiers took place near Kxx Txxx village. At the time B--- R----- S----’s husband, - T- was not in the village. He was working in his paddy field. Because he was not in the village the army accused him of helping the Karenni armed group.
After they couldn’t find the T--- , the soldiers arrested his wife and children instead of him and imprisoned them for 15 days.
“In the prison, they
interrogated me, asking if I knew where my husband was. When
questioning me, they slapped my face and hit me with bamboo,”
she said.
The people of Karenni State have been facing hardships and human rights abuses for decades, which have become worse as militarisation increases. It is important to remember that the use of human rights abuses to oppress the population is not a short-term tactic.
2.1.2 Militarisation
Miltarisation in Karenni State has increased over the past six years. Currently there are 13 battalions permanently deployed in Karenni State, as well as additional rotating troops. In order to support these troops, army bases have been established throughout Karenni State in strategic locations, which have disrupted traditional trade routes. Roads have been constructed in Karenni State to transport supplies and equipment to army bases – ensuring that they are always well stocked and, sadly, ready for action. There is also a high prevalence of landmines in Karenni State, and death and permanent disability because of landmines is common. Both the SPDC and non-state actors have laid landmines, and both parties rarely map or make villagers aware of minefields.
“The SPDC lays landmines in the farms,
gardens and at the bottom of ladders into rice stores,”
K- R--- said.
As with landmines, both the Burmese army and non-state actors, including the KNPP use child soldiers. The Burmese army systematically and forcibly recruits children as young as eight19 into the army and currently has an estimated 70,000 child soldiers.20 This is the largest number of child soldiers anywhere in the world. Among the 1,000 to 1,200 KNPP troops, an estimated 20 per cent of them are under the age of 1821 (the minimum age for recruitment into the armed forces under Burma’s national law22). Many children also fight as part of the local militias. In 2006 the KNPP started working with UN agencies to disarm, rehabilitate and reintegrate child soldiers into Karenni society.23 The SPDC has made token gestures towards disarming child soldiers, however, recruitment practices, including rewards for fulfilling recruitment quotas, continue.24
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After 50 years of protracted conflict, the effects of the civil war can be seen everywhere in Karenni society. Battered into submission by an unrelenting military regime, ceasefire groups and the armed opposition groups’ villagers dare not express dissent. Suspicion of strangers, friends, and neighbours is a way of life, as betrayal to the authorities for expressing discontent can come from any direction.
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The reasons behind the militarisation of Karenni State have shifted. Previously, defeating the armed resistance movement was the main reason for militarisation, whereas nowadays it is to secure sites for development projects and the extraction of natural resources. Without stability around development project sites and along transportation routes, international companies and foreign governments will not invest. In order to secure complete control villagers are often relocated to areas close to military bases where they can be easily monitored by the SPDC. The military launch patrols to search for villagers who are remaining in their villages or hiding in the jungle resisting relocation orders. Once an area has been depopulated, or the population is being controlled in a forced relocation site, it is easier for the SPDC to begin a development project.
The increased in militarisation in Karenni State has significantly impacted on the people. The presence of extra troops has resulted in more human rights violations, especially arbitrary taxation (money extortion) and land confiscation, undermining people’s ability and capacity to survive.
2.1.3 Retaliation for KNPP acts
Civilians, in both villages and relocation sites, are often punished by the SPDC in retaliation for the actions of the KNPP. This is done despite the fact that villagers have no control over the movement or actions of soldiers from the KNPP. This retaliation can take the form of money extortion (arbitrary taxation), forced labour (especially sentry duty), beatings and torture, as well as other punishments.
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Retaliation
On the evening January 1st, 2007, there was fighting between the SPDC (Kx Mx Yxxx 250) and the KNPP near Pxx Kxxx Kxx village, Pxxxx Sxx Township. During the fighting the SPDC deputy commander was killed. The fighting only lasted about 15 minutes before the KNPP left the area. After the fighting the SPDC troops came to Pxx Kxxx Kxx village. The SPDC troops burnt nine villagers’ rice stores.
Two days later (January 3rd, 2007) at 7.30 in the morning they sent a message ordering the Pxx Kxxx Kxx village chairman to come to the army camp. When he arrived at the army camp the SPDC soldiers arrested him and killed him.
Later that same day, the soldiers ordered all the villagers to come to the army camp. The village secretary and religious leader were among the villagers that went to the army camp. When they arrived the soldiers asked in a threatening way where the village secretary and religious leader were. But no one told them. That day the SPDC soldiers stole two pigs and more than 30 chickens from the villagers.
Later some villagers went to the army camp and asked the camp leader where the village chairman was. He did not answer them or tell them where they had buried him. The villagers searched around the army camp and found a fresh grave. They knew that their village chairman had been killed
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2.1.4 Daily Reporting
“Every day one villager
from each village has to go to the army camp to report about
the situation near their community, in particular if there
have been any opposition troops in the area. On every Thursday
all village headmen must go to the army camp. After the headmen
have gathered in the camp, a soldier will call each headman
by their name and ask if you have something important to report
or not. Normally, we tell them “no. No important news”. Afterwards
the soldiers will tell us we can leave. If you are late, even
only a few minutes, they (the soldiers) will accuse you of
contacting KNPP troops and threaten you.” – K- R-- said.
Every day a representative from each village has to go to the local Burmese army base or camp and report on what has happened in their communities over the past 24 hours. Once a week all village leaders have to go to the military camp/base for a meeting. If a village does not send a representative each day or their leaders, there are serious consequences, such as the village headman being tortured, villages being looted, houses, or crops being destroyed.
Villagers, stressed and pressured to report to the SPDC, are too busy to think beyond sheer survival, they do not have time to think about the future, or to plan non-violent resistance to oppression enforced upon them by the Burmese military.
2.1.5 Spies
“People look at each
other with suspicion eyes,” D--- W-- said.
A common trend among ethnic groups in Karenni State is the continuing mistrust within communities and between tribes. The SPDC uses spies within communities to control villagers. Spies report to the SPDC about villagers activities, who is absent from the village for extended period of times, who is suspected of sharing information with KNPP soldiers, etc. The junta gives concessions to people who act as spies, for example they may be exempt from forced labour demands.
Villagers usually resort to spying on their friends and families because the situation they are facing is so desperate and they can see no other way to survive. Subsequently, villagers are so scared that their activities are going to be reported to the local authorities that they do not trust one another, even to the extreme of not trusting family members. Based on the information provided by spies, community members are punished if they have done something that does not fit in with the SPDC’s narrow definition of acceptable activities.
“People have been
killed because spies in the village have given information
to armed groups,” K-- R-- said.
This impacts on humanitarian assistance being delivered to vulnerable people, as communities are less willing to work with or even receive community based organisation (CBO) staff because they fear that the CBO workers are spies. This extends to within communities where people are further isolated because they cannot trust their next-door neighbours, let alone outsiders.
2.1.6 Extreme Isolation
Tactics employed by the SPDC have deliberately isolated different ethnic groups to create divisions and tensions between these groups. Using divide and rule strategies, the Burmese military junta develops a specific plan of action for each ethnic area.
This isolates communities and divides them from other ethnic groups. Furthermore, organised resistance is done so on ethnic divisions, tribes are further isolated from one another. As different ethnic groups have made ceasefire agreements with the military junta, this act has created tensions between ceasefire and non-ceasefire groups. In different ethnic areas ceasefire groups act as a proxy army for the SPDC, which result in Karenni’s killing Karenni people.
2.2 Non-State Actor tactics
“We lead a very hard
life. We have to listen to both the KNPP and the SPDC. We
have to balance them carefully. If not one side or the other
will punish us. We are being treated as mere dirt,” P----
R-- said.
Villagers face oppression not just from the Burmese military, but also from ceasefire and armed opposition groups. As the SPDC presence in Karenni State has grown stronger, the ceasefire groups control over areas of land has decreased. Consequently the protection that ceasefire groups offer to villagers and IDPs has also decreased significantly. Nowadays, in ceasefire areas, groups conduct patrols with the Burmese army and extort money from villagers in the form of taxation. Instead of protecting villagers from human rights abuses, ceasefire groups are violating the people’s rights and are assisting the SPDC to do so.
However, grassroots communities are not just oppressed by the Burmese military junta or the ceasefire groups. Some KNPP soldiers abuse their power. The soldiers ignore the people’s opinions, threaten them, and use violence against them. KNPP soldiers also commit human rights abuses against the villagers and lay landmines.
As a result of this behaviour, some villagers are supporting the KNPP soldiers out of fear, not respect. In fact, the people in some village tracts visited by BI Field Staff were so afraid of the KNPP soldiers, that they requested CBO workers replace them. The villagers were worried about the security risk the KNPP soldiers were posing and it was having a negative impact on some of their livelihoods.
2.3 Non-violent Resistance Tactics
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Village Headman
In some villages in the rural areas of Karenni State where the Karenni National Progressive Party and the State Peace and Development Council’s troops and ceasefire groups are active, no one wants to serve as the village headman. Villages have started to practice a compulsory rotating system among villagers, to serve as headman when no one volunteers for the position. Being a village headman is not about governing the community, it is to share the torture.
The term of headman is different from one village to another; some villages practice three months per term, others four months or six months and the longest term is one year. People who take their turn, according to the compulsory rotating system, and serve as village headmen are called “bad-lucked persons”, as they have to encounter many dangers during their turn.
Daily duties of headman are that he/she must send one of their villagers to the SPDC army camp (which for some villages entails about a 12 hour walk (round trip), and report the situation, in particular whether KNPP troops have been around their village or not. The headman is responsible for the accuracy of this daily report. Then, every Friday, all villages’ headmen themselves must go to the army camp for a meeting and report on the situation.
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“The Karenni soldiers
and the Burmese soldiers come to the village and eat people’s
food. Villagers have no authority to stop either side from
coming to their village. We want the SPDC to keep their promise
and not harm civilians, and we also want the KNPP to respect
the requests of villagers especially when their activities
compromise the safety and security of civilians,” – T--- R---
said.
In areas of active armed conflict, after decades of military attacks and offensives, villagers have developed a number of coping strategies that aim to minimise the impact of the SPDC’s violence and abuse. Villagers monitor troop movements through a number of different channels including displaced villagers passing through their area, pre-established communication networks among local communities (for example regularly meeting with members of different communities to share information), civilian security guards and opposition troops. These early warning systems enable villagers to prepare and flee before SPDC troops arrive, avoiding the threat of violence and human rights abuses.
In addition to early warning systems, villagers also establish a number of household risk management practices that include: hiding food supplies and crops, preparing an emergency evacuation procedure, regularly moving locations, working at night to avoid detection, paying fines and complying with forced labour orders. Villager level risk management plans are also established, in which the community works together and pools their resources in order to avoid the SPDC troops.
Since the SPDC gained control over most of the border areas in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it is no longer armed groups that are seen as the strongest form of resistance to the junta - the people are. By defying forced relocation orders, bribing officials to avoid forced labour quotas and fleeing to the jungle rather than being controlled, the villagers are staging their own resistance movement. The SPDC has realised that if they want to gain control over the entire area and population they need to attack the villagers, not the armed groups.
Footnotes:
16 “Chronic Emergency: Health and Human Rights in Eastern Burma”, Back Pack Health Worker Team, 2006
17 “Inflation in Burma: When the State budget deficits are financed by the money printing machine”, Burma Issues Newsletter, August 2007
18 “Internal Displacement in Eastern Burma: 2007 Survey”, Thailand Burma Border Consortium, October 2007
19 “Growing Up Under the Burma Dictatorship”, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, August 2003
20 “My Gun was as tall as me: Child Soldiers in Burma”, Human Rights Watch, October 2002
21 “My Gun was as tall as me: Child Soldiers in Burma”, Human Rights Watch, October 2002
22 Myanmar Defense Services Act (1947), Letter to Human Rights Watch from the Permanent Mission of the Union of Myanmar to the UN, May 8h, 2002
23 “UN: Imposes Burma Arms Embargo to End Child Soldier Use”, Human Rights Watch,
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/12/05/burma17481.htm , December 5th, 2007, Deed of Commitment signed on April 13, 2007, by the chairman of the KNPP and the commander-in-chief of the KA.
24 “Child Soldiers: Victims and Oppressors”, Burma Issues Newsletter, September 2006
To read other sections of the report please use the links below:
Executive Summary
Introduction
Livelihoods
Health
Education
Drugs
Internal Displacement
Threats to Regional and Internationl
Stability
Recommendations
Appendices
To email BI about our report, Living Ghosts, or the situation in Karenni State please click this link.
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